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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this study is to analyze the social processes leading 
to the formation of the Residential Crime Prevention Committee (RCPC), 
the social relations which developed within this committee and those 
relations developing between the committee members and city officials. 
It is seen as a contribution to the understanding of cooptation and 
the situations and circumstances in which it might occur. This study 
seeks to place the evolution of the RCPC within a historical and 
political situation where cooptation appears to be a viable social 
process. 
The Residential Crime Prevention Committee was first conceptualized 
in a grant proposal written by the Evanston Police Department in 1979. 
This prosposal was submitted to the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission 
(ILEC) along with a request for funding for a three year period. While 
the study and analysis of crime prevention programs represents an 
important area for sociological research, it is not the intention of 
this study to either evaluate the crime prevention program developed by 
the RCPC or compare it to other programs across the nation. 
As it was originally conceived, the RCPC was an overt attempt 
by the city police department to develop a working relationship between 
the police department and the larger community. Like the majority 
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of contemporary urban areas, Evanston had experienced an increasing 
crime rate which traditional methods of policing had been relatively 
ineffective in combating. This crime prevention grant called for the 
concerted efforts of citizens and police to develop a crime prevention 
program which met the needs and concerns of Evanston residents. 
In the Fall of 1979, a new community group was formed which made 
the rising crime rate their issue of central concern. This community 
organization chose to place the responsibility for this crime problem 
squarely on the police department and on the chief of police as the 
administrator of this department. This group initially voiced its 
concern through legitimately recognized channels such as communication 
through the appropriate alderpersons or communication with the city 
manager's office. However. as the concerns of this group gained in 
intensity, protests were communicated directly to the city manager's 
office and the city council. As the issues and demands were developed 
and presented to city officials, these efforts were publicized and 
legitimized by the local community newspaper. Local mass media served 
to add "fuel" to a small scale conflict between a community organiza-
tion and city officials. 
This conflictive situation eventually led to a highly publicized 
controversy surrounding the competency of the police chief and the 
police organization as a whole. This controversy drew sufficient 
public attention so that city officials felt a need to respond to the 
charges and allegations against the department. Responses by the city 
administration took a variety of directions. Three general modes of 
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reaction can be delineated which are based on specific objects of 
criticism. The criticisms directed towards the Evanston Police Depart-
ment (EPD) were aimed at the administrative, the organizational and 
the community levels. 
While the original basis of the RCPC was a genuine desire to 
develop cooperation between residents and police in the prevention and 
solution of crime, it came_to have a new meaning with the development 
of the police controversy. This study hypothesizes that as the police 
controversy gained in intensity, the RCPC became the object of cooptive 
efforts by both city and police administration. At the height of this 
controversy in 1980, the RCPC was cited by city and police officials 
as an example of the city's efforts to alleviate the crime problem. 
This study seeks to investigate the possibility that the RCPC ~~a 
as a means whereby community leaders (including the leaders of the 
conflictive community group) would be "absorbed" into a connnittee 
charged with the responsibility of developing a residential crime 
prevention program which could be implemented on a city wide basis. 
This committee involvement would, in all probability, direct attention 
away from public criticism, and into a collaborative effort by citizens 
and police. 
Research Methods 
The information presented in this study has been gathered by a 
variety of research methods. Information on the historical situation 
in which the RCPC will be placed was gathered in two ways. Initial 
input and interest in the potential "cooptability" of the RCPC was the 
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result of the author's full time employment in the police department 
involved and as a member of the larger social network of which this 
organization was a part. Recognition of the RCPC as a potential source 
of cooptation came to light as city and police officials took an increas-
ing interest in the development of the RCPC. The author was involved 
in an official capacity in the planning and data collection of a resi-
dential burglary study conducted as part of the Comprehensive Crime 
Prevention Program (CCPP). This direct involvement with the crime prev-
ention grant coupled with interviews and discussions with other organi-
zational members provided much of the detail of the broader situational 
context of which the RCPC was part. This information was supplemented 
by a content analysis of local newspaper coverage of the crime contro-
versy and its consequences. 
The actual data concerning the social processes which both shaped 
the RCPC and developed within the RCPC was gathered by three overlapping 
methods. First, the author's role as a participant observer in the 
RCPC from the outset provided a cumulative analysis of the social 
evolution of this committee. The author was introduced as a researcher 
interested in studying community groups in the first meeting. This 
was accepted without question. This natural acceptance was partially 
due to the fact that Evanston is comprised of a highly educated 
citizenry and a larger number of people associated professionally 
with Northwestern University. Observations and notes were made at all 
RCPC meetings which provided valuable insight into the interactions 
between members and the Resource Committee. These observations 
provided a point of comparison over time. 
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Field observations were supplemented by in depth interviews 
with community group leaders which comprise the committee and also 
with representatives of the police department which comprise the 
Resource Committee. These interviews were conducted with a preconceived 
set of questions which were open ended in nature. As relevant issues 
or points were discovered in each interview, these were incorporated 
-into subsequent interviews. Appendix A represents the topical format 
utilized in these interviews. These interviews provided a rich source 
of insight into the social processes operating between committee members 
and between community group leaders and their constituencies. These 
interviews were invaluable in assessing committee member's perceptions 
of the degree of influence and control exerted by members of the Resource 
Committee in the formation of RCPC policy. 
A questionnaire was also administered to community leaders. The 
questionnaire, which is presented in Appendix B, had three functions. 
First, it sought information on the background of the particular 
community groups represented on the RCPC. Second, it was designed to 
ascertain information regarding the usual channels of "protest" employed 
by these groups in the resolution of specific community problems. Third, 
the identification of a pre-existing cooperative network between com-
munity groups or between community groups and the police department 
was also a major goal behind the administration of these questionnaires. 
The analysis of documents distributed by the municipal govern-
ment, the police department and the RCPC were also included in research-
ing this problem. These included such things as interoffice memo-
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orandums (both from the city manager's office and the chief of police), 
the Managment Study of the police department and documents distributed 
to and by the RCPC. 
One last point concerning the collection of data with regard to 
the RCPC is necessary here. The author's role as a paid employee of 
the police department was a valuable asset in collecting the necessary 
data for this study. Members of the Evanston Police Department and the 
Residential Crime Prevention Committee have been most cooperative in 
assisting my efforts in this collection and I wish to acknowledge that 
cooperation. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE: COOPTIVE MODELS 
Cooptation was first introduced as a sociological process in 
Philip Selznick's seminal work, TVA and the Grassroots (1949). This 
study is regarded as a classic study in both the formal and informal 
processes developed within a complex organizational setting. Having 
intellectual roots in both Parsons and Michels, Selznick produced a 
study done in the classic tradition of the structural-functionalist 
school with the social and political critiques characteristic of 
Michels. 
Parsons' theoretical approach to the study of complex organiza-
tions represents an equilibrium model which treats the organization as 
a natural system. As social systems, organizations must meet function-
al imperatives in order to survive. These functional imperatives become 
tangible through the formal statement and the actual process of goal 
attainment. Thus organizations develop subsystems in order to solve 
problems of adaption, achieve organizational goals, to coordinate and 
integrate members' activities within the system and finally to maintain 
consensus on legitimized values. Within the natural system framework, 
goal attainment is achieved by controlling the utilization of resources 
and the processes by which these resources are mobilized. 
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In Political Parties (1962) Michels focuses attention on the 
internal processes of the organization, specifically with the process 
of goal displacement. For Michels, power is a major organizational 
factor in the displacement of goals. Bureaucratic structure within 
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the organization is a necessary element in the mobilization and dis-
tribution of resources. However, for Michels this bureaucratic struc-
tures represents a system of political domination which arises from a 
shift of power from the legitimate source of authority to the leaders. 
Bureaucracy ceases to be merely an instrument of organization and be-
comes a tool whereby officials come to attain more power than necessary 
for the performance of their legitimate tasks. Michels' expectation 
is that this will inevitably result in an abuse of power. Michel's 
"Iron Law of Oligarchy" assumes that organizational power will centra-
lize in the hands of a few and will utimately result in the dislocation 
of organizational goals. 
Selznick was concerned with the actual process of goal attain-
ment pursued by the TVA, and the political and practical means employed 
to survive a potentially hostile local environment. Also, basic to 
this process were the TVA's efforts to retain its new found degree 
of autonomy from the federal government. Selznick was guided by two 
basic questions: "How were the abstractions of the "grassroots" 
doctrine specified operationally, this is, how did they show up in the 
actual course of decision-making"?(Selznick, 1949: xii). In the true 
Michelian approach, how did the TVA take an abstract ideology and 
combine it with practical means aimed at achieving its goals? "What 
effect did this operative conduct have on the moral posture and com-
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petency of the TVA as a government agency?" (Selznick, 1949: xii). 
In other words, did the adaptive processes the TVA underwent in deal-
ing with both its proximate environment and its position as an experi-
mental governmental agency, and the process by which abstract ideals 
were transferred into workable goals, compromise the democratic ideals 
under which the TVA claimed to operate? Selznick sought to show that 
through its grassroots committments, the TVA came to be restricted in 
its efforts to reach goal objectives. 
Selznick was interested in the informal, even "pathological" 
mechanisms of organizational survival. In this pursuit, he was more 
concerned with the informal interactions between the agency, its mem-
bers, the federal government and other institutions in its area of 
operation. 
For Selznick the formal structures of an organization failed to 
deal with and control the nonrational dimensions of organizational 
behavior. Selznick believed the informal structures which both the 
leadership and membership created to closer approximate unmet needs, 
were critically important in understanding goal attainment or lack of 
goal attainment in organizations. These informal structures were of 
three basic kinds: informal relationships (i.e. friendships, etc.) 
ideologies, and cooptation. It is the informal mechanism of cooptation 
which is the concern of the present discussion. 
In studying the informal mechanisms of organizational behavior, 
Selznick was the first to introduce the sociological concept known as 
cooptation. Selznick's use of the term was unique in that his def-
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inition of this "process" came to have negative political overtones 
which is lacking in the strict dictionary definition of the word. 
Webster defines coopt as "choosing or electing into a body or committee 
by the votes of its own membership". {Webster's Dictionary, 1977: 87). 
Selznick defined cooptation as "the process of absorbing new 
elements into the leadership or policy determining structure of an 
organization as a means of averting threats to its stability or exis-
tence". (Selznick, 1949: 13). In studying the TVA, Selznick found 
that in order to utilize existing local channels of communication and 
ensure legitimacy in the local community, already existing organiza-
tions in the valley were approached for inclusion in the TVA's programs. 
Selznick documents this process of assimilation and the consequences 
of this cooptation in terms of the TVA's loss of total control over 
the decision making and the diverson of future programs from organiza-
tional goals because of specific interest groups. 
Selznick further delimited cooptation into two basic types. For-
mal cooptation was employed when an organization needed to visibly ab-
sorb new elements into its ranks. This is often accomplished by appoint-
ment of representatives of the perceived adversary to the board of 
directors or an actual contractual agreement between two organizations. 
Selznick identifies two conditions under which formal cooptation becomes 
a viable choice. The first pertains to a lack of legitimacy of the 
coopting agency or the perceived lack of legitimacy. The second con-
dition exists when a "self-governing" body finds it necessary to devel-
op reliable channels of communication such as that between trade unions 
11 
and the industrial business sector. Informal cooptation is an option 
appropriate as a response to specific centers of power in a community 
and is characterized by an informal reciprocal relationships whereby 
these informal demands go into shaping the structure and policy of the 
institution under question. 
While these two types of cooptation cannot be regarded as mutually 
exclusive, their separation is useful in terms of analyzing the actual 
or perceived "sharing of power" and the actual or perceived "loss of 
power" on the part of formal authority. Approached from either end, 
cooptation represents a "tension between formal authority and social 
power" (Selznick, 1949: 15) whereby formal authority strives to main-
tain legitimacy in the eyes of its public and the social power to make 
decisions. 
In an attempt to generalize this adaptive process, the remainder 
of this chapter will examine the way in which subsequent writers have 
dealt with the operationalization of cooptation, its generalizability 
to other organizations or institutions and the way in which cooptation 
has been distinguished from "participation" dominant in democratic 
ideology. The discussion will then proceed to a conceptualization of a 
recent "power" struggle between a local municipal government and a 
coalition of concerned citizens. 
Economic/Market Structural Model 
In reviewing other research dealing with the concept of coopta-
tion, three separate areas of organizational domain can be identified. 
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These models consist of the following: the economic/market structural 
model, the large scale social movement perspective and cooptation within 
the local community power structure. 
The economic/market structural model has been concerned with the 
employment of cooptive techniques to lessen the "market constraints" 
imposed both intra-organizationally and extra-organizationally. This 
type of research is typified by Burt (1980a;l980b). Mathematical models 
have been developed for use in predicting situations where cooptive 
strategies will be more prevalent. 
Burt (1980a) provides a unique measurement of structural autonomy 
by a combination of two aspects of autonomy which have been treated 
separately in the literature--autonomy via oligopoly and ·autonomy via 
group-affiliation. Burt essentially introduces a network concept of 
autonomy where oligopoly is seen as "focusing on the relations among 
structurally equivalent actors occupying a status" (Burt, 1980a: 900). 
Burt thus defines high structural autonomy as being composed of three 
characteristics: 1) in jointly occupying a particular position, there 
is high centralization of this group of actors such that they form an 
oligopoly 2) their relations to actors of other statuses are varied and 
these other actors do not form oligopolies themselves and 3) the inter-
action effect of these two conditions. Structural autonomy is then 
used to hypothesize relationships where cooptive relations will appear 
and not appear and where cooptation will lead to an actual increase in 
autonomy. 
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In an attempt to empirically demonstrate cooptive strategies 
Burt treated manufacturing industries in the American economy in 1967 
as structurally equivalent actors. The profits of each industry as a 
whole were used as a measure of the relative autonomy of firms in 
separate industries. High profits in turn were deemed an indication 
of structural autonomy. From these relations, Burt hypothesized that 
cooptive strategies would be apparent in the merger patterns of firms--
specifically that firms in an industry will purchase other firms in 
attempts to "coopt" constraints placed on the industry's structural 
autonomy. 
Methodologically, Burt steps between two units of analysis. It 
is not clear whether the industry or the firm is his unit of analysis 
or whether his hypothesis of cooptive strategies is believed to hold 
true across firms in the same industry, across different industries or 
both. 
Conceptually, he relies on merger patterns as a cooptive strategy, 
however, his assumption is that such a merger is a one way strategy 
designed to enhance the position of the coopting firm. This precludes 
the possibility that the coopted firm has a vested interest in the 
merger or for that matter that a "coopted" or "coopting" firm can even 
be identified. In essence, Burt has equated structural autonomy with 
power itself, an assumption empirically unjustified. Further, Burt 
reduced the generalizability of the concept of structural autonomy to 
be "most promising in a system where there is a clear separation of 
formal from informal potentially cooptive relations" (Burt, 198Ca:923)--
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a situation highly unlikely in most complex organizational relation-
ship networks. This again raises the issue of separating cooptive 
strategies from mutually beneficial contractual agreements (collabora-
tion). 
In a second article exploring the use of corporate cooptive 
strategies, Burt et al (1980b) focuses on directorate ties between 
organizations as a cooptive strategy aimed at reducing market constraints 
on profits. Here the focus is on "establishment" as the unit of 
analysis and this is consistently maintained throughout the entire 
study. The underlying assumption of this study is that interorganiza-
tional directoral ties is synonymous with cooptation. Burt, et al 
state that "cooptation is a rationalization for action without a 
specification of parameters for action" (Burt, 1980b: 823). This is 
as close as the authors came to a working definition of cooptation. 
This statement leaves us no closer to either an understanding of 
cooptation nor a means for distinguishing it from other social processes 
such as cooperation and negotiation. 
Large Scale Social Movements 
A second focus of cooptation research has been the cooptation 
of specific social movements in the political arena on a broader 
macro-level. Eckstein (1976, 1977) re-conceptualizes Selznick's 
definition of cooptation to account for the relative ineffectiveness 
of various poor people's organizations in urban Mexico. Eckstein 
attempts to demonstrate use use of cooptation as a means of regulating 
the poor and just what processes impede these coopted groups from 
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utilizing their formal power to benefit their own ends. Eckstein 
establishes a conceptual distinction between "cooptation" as an individ-
ual (adaptive) process (this term referring basically to organizational 
leadership) and "incorporation" as a process of absorbing whole groups 
of people. She further maintains that these two processes do not 
necessarily occur together nor do they necessarily take the same form. 
In her study of organizations designed for the benefit of poor 
urban Mexicans, Eckstein found that such groups had come increasingly 
under the control of the ruling political party and had gradually ceased 
to provide services independently of the government. These groups, 
many of which had originally been concerned only with particular social 
issues, came to have the "general welfare" of these poor people as an 
overarching ideological committment. These groups came to be formally 
associated with the prevailing political party and ruling class because 
of the delivery of material benefits which they needed. However, be-
cause of the absorption of these groups into the formal political 
structure and subsequent threat of collective demands reduced, these 
material gains were short-lived. Formal absorption into the dominant 
political arena imposed tactical restrictions on the forms which their 
requests and demands for social justice could take. "Demands" were 
no longer tolerated. "Requests" came to be presented on individual 
terms rather than on a collective basis. Further, group leaders became 
less and less willing to engage in political demands because of their 
interests in advancing their own political careers. 
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In their classic study of Poor People's Movements (1979), Piven 
and Cloward state similar conclusions in their analyses of the un-
employment worker's movements of the 30' and 40's, the industrial 
worker's movement and the civil rights and welfare rights movements of 
the 60's. Piven and Cloward do not deal with a formally stated theory 
of cooptation, however, the process which this concept represents plays 
a major role in their theory of why poor people's movements usually 
fail. Their theory revolves around the tendency of movement leader-
ship to become more concerned with the day to day organization and 
maintenance of the movement (including their own positions) and less 
with the long range goals. This deflection of energy from political 
action or pressure (in their terms insurgency) and subsequent pre-
occupation for organization building, greatly reduces the material 
and political gains which the threat of insurgency might elicit. Piven 
and Cloward criticize movement leaders (most particularly the radical 
leaders of the left) for not taking full advantage of the demands to be 
won by the full blown militancy or threat of militancy which a class 
or sector of people possess. Piven and Cloward attempt to distinguish 
the social-historical conditions which shape a movement's course of 
action and the organizational forms which develop within a movement which 
either promulgate or thwart movement gains. Admittedly in the tradition 
of Michels, Piven and Cloward maintain that the "imperatives of mass-
membership organizational maintenance" (1979: xvi) characteristically 
create an elite leadership which is prone to the process of cooptation 
either by efforts to secure financial/political stability for the 
organization or by efforts to secure these gains for themselves. 
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Dealing exclusively with social movements seeking both immediate and 
long term social changes, Piven and Cloward maintain that intensive 
efforts at organization enable the political elite to absorb leaders 
either by offering them paid positions or by neutralizing the political 
clout of their "insurgency". By making demands/negotiations a rational, 
organized procedure-- the ruling class is then in a position to predict 
the behavior of movement members. 
On a somewhat smaller scale, similar conditions were reached in a 
study of the Umoja Federation, a women's group formed during the 
colonial era in Western Kenya. Staudt(l980) found that the local 
autocratic chief (male) and his administrative staff were instrumental 
in organizing and legitimizing a local women's group. The chief was 
responsible for reducing soil erosion and land c9nsolidation for sub-
sequent land registration. Since women were traditionally responsible 
for agriculture and boundaries were to be maintained by euphorkin bushes, 
the chief actively sought the mobilization of women in these efforts. 
Leaders were "coopted" from women already recognized and respected in 
the community. These female leaders were given the added responsibility 
of judging the behavior of their consituencies. Staudt thus attributes 
the "cooptation" of the female leaders into the male power structure, 
as a major factor in the subsequent demise of the organization and 
dissaffection of the membership base. 
Finally, a recent article by Bielasiak (1980) explored the 
change in the recruitment of leaders in the communist bloc countries 
of Eastern Europe (1954-1971). Bielasiak documented an unprecedented 
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increase in the recruitment of "expert knowledge" as opposed to the 
recruitments of young people into "career" lines within the communist 
party. Typically, the cooptation of experts into the existing 
communist regime, occurred at later stages in these experts' careers, 
indicating this as the communist government's solution to a pressing 
need for expert technical, economic or political knowledge not 
possessed by party members in power. In other words, these experts 
were coopted into providing the regime with the technology it needed 
to survive in a highly complex "post-industrial" society without the 
dissemination of power characteristic of a "career" party member. The 
Soviet Union was found to have "coopted" a significantly larger per-
centage of officials than had other communist bloc countries such as 
Poland or Rumania. Bielasiak attributes this to the greater stability 
of the communist regime in the Soviet Union and the resultant "greater 
pool of trustworthy non-political elite" groups. Bielasiak's study 
represents an interesting application of the cooptive process to a 
national political regime and the implications of this cooptation 
for political survival of the ruling elite. 
As can be seen by the variety of environmental situations cited 
in the above section, cooptation has been utilized at the societal 
level in a number of ways. In Eckstein's study of poor urban Mexicans, 
cooptive measures were employed by the national political party to limit 
the strong influence of the Catholic Church and the individual power of 
local officials in both the political and economical arenas. Piven 
and Cloward have attributed the diffusion of political power of the 
power classes in the United States to the inclination of movement lead-
ers to concentrate too many resources on organizing rather than on 
incidents of insurgency. The political elite subsequently take ad-
vantage of the survival needs of these organizers/organizations by 
coopting the leadership of such movements. 
Bielasiak demonstrated the use of cooptive strategies employed 
by communist bloc countries in order to incorporate certain levels 
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of expertise and knowledge into the party framework without relin-
quishing any actual power. Studies in the social movement perspective 
are indicative of the innumerable ways that cooptation can be utilized 
as a source of power and influence in reinforcing the dominate ideology 
and maintaining the social control of the ruling class. 
Local Power Structure Model 
The third area which the cooptive process has been documented 
has been in the realm of local community power struggles. Seiler, et 
al (1979) accumulated reputational leadership data to identify persons 
having the greatest impact on community life following the location of 
a major steel mill in that community. Seiler, et al found that repu-
tationally, the steel mill officials were not seen as playing a major 
role in effecting community decisions or developments. However, the 
authors maintain that the steel mill actually had a great deal of im-
pact on community affairs by using a combination of three strategies. 
The three types of corporate strategies were unilateral action, coopta-
tion, and intervention. Unilateral techniques involved direct but 
subtle action on the part of the corporation. This technique was 
typified by the fact that the corporate officers of the steel mill kept 
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their intentions of locating the steel mill within the community from 
public knowledge until significant portions of community land had been 
acquired. The company also actively prevented a population explosion 
from occurring (a situation which would have significantly raised their 
taxes to provide the additional community services required by such an 
influx of people) by actively seeking job applicants from surrounding 
communities within a 50 mile radius. 
The use of cooptation was exemplified by the procurement of ser-
vices from at least five of the most prominent reputional and positional 
leaders in the county for the steel mill. While the corporation was 
adamant about keeping the steel mill personnel out of active partici-
pation in the community, it made members of the community a part of the 
steel mill. "Thus, cooptation was a "one-way street" and were conflicts 
of interest to occur, community residents would be in the middle, not 
J & L executives" (Seiler, 1979: 381). 
Intervention was a third techinque utilized by the corporation 
in looking out for its "economic interests" in the community. This 
technique was typified by J & L's retention of a consulting firm to 
design a new high school for the community when it became apparent that 
the elaborate design proposed by citizens would significantly raise the 
tax needs of the county. 
The lack of inclusion of J & L executives in the reputational 
community leadership data indicated that the corporation was success-
ful, through a combination of techniques, of concealing its own involve-
ment in guiding community affairs. In this case, as in many of the 
previous studies, it appears that it is organizationally more 
efficient to manipulate the environment than rearrange the organiza-
tion itself. 
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Research in this theoretical model has also approached the process 
of cooptation as a political strategy of local citizen groups in their 
attempt to realize concessions from local officials. Galaskiewicz 
(1981) attempted a study in the pluralist tradition by testing two 
basic models of citizen participation. These models are 1) the 
cooptation model and 2) the intimidation model. This study attempted 
to distinguish the variables which made either strategy more success-
ful or more desirable for the interest group. Three main indepen-
dent variables were used: 1) size of the interest group 2) the previous 
experience of interest group in political affairs and 3) socioeconom-
ic status of interest group. The intervening variable was access -
the degree of interpersonal contact with city officials. Galaskiewicz's 
conclusions appear to support Piven and Cloward's assertion that low-
er class movements tend to lose their political "clout" when the threat 
of insurgency is less, and negotiation is a more dominant strategy. 
He found that larger, less experienced and lower socioeconomic status 
groups had better access to city officials, but it was the larger, 
more experienced and higher status groups which had more success in 
pursuing their group interests. 
The three focal points of recent research on the process of 
cooptation represent the diverse way in which cooptive strategies may 
be utilized, the unique way individual researchers have of conceptual-
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izing and measuring cooptation and perhaps even the pervasiveness 
of the process as a strategy in everyday life. The one element which 
many of these studies has in common, is their view of cooptation as 
an aggressive strategy of both interest groups and organizations in 
dealing with stability issues such as resource acquisition and alloca-
tion, the use of expert knowledge and increased political clout. None 
of the above cited studies deals with the other possibility raised by 
Selznick--cooptive strategies as a response aimed at diverting public 
attention away from specific community concerns. Previous research 
has primarily been concerned with "preventing" legimitimacy or power 
crises from occurring. 
The potentially cooptive situation investigated in the present 
study differs from the three basic models in several ways. The 
economic/market structure model represents a quantifiable model which 
attempts to predict when a cooptive strategy will be employed. This 
model deals exclusively with cooptation in the corporate business 
setting. Burt•s (1980a; 1980b) corporate model is not one which can 
be easily transferred to other social situations. His measurement of 
structural autonomy and merger patterns do not allow the prediction 
of cooptation outside the corporate structure. While it is useful to 
study situations where cooptation is utilized as a social process 
and attempt to predict from such a model, it must be emphasized here 
that cooptation is not always the result of an intention strategy. 
Evanston represents a case where the RCPC was conceptualized without 
the intention of cooptation but may have been the object of cooptive 
strategies as a consequence of the police controversy. 
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Piven and Cloward's study of Poor People's Movements (1979), 
provides a helpful analysis of particular resources available to social 
movements. Their emphasis on insurgency or the threat of insurgency 
is a helpful way of analyzing the main resource available to the Mary-
wood Neighbors Association in Evanston. While the Evanston group can 
in no way be considered a poor people's movement, the vocalization 
of their concerns and demands in both the media and council meetings, 
placed the reform government in a defensive position. 
Bielasiak's study (1980) of the communist party's cooptation of 
"experts" into their government was helpful in pointing out a broad-
er situation where cooptive strategies might be utilized. However, 
this particular situation differs from the case at hand because the 
"coopted" individuals possess expertise needed by the "coopting" 
group. In the case of Evanston, the Resource Committee as represent-
atives of the police/city administration, were the ones with the 
expert knowledge. They were therefore charged with the responsibility 
of passing this knowledge on to the RCPC. 
The local power structure model is the basic model from which 
the Evanston case will be analyzed, however, studies in this frame-
work have differed in terms of the specific object of cooptation. 
Seiler (1979) identified cooptation as a strategy employed by a steel 
mill which was attempting to "ease" into a new community and exert 
some control over the community development which might effect company 
profits or policy. In this case the steel mill's addition to the 
community represented a similar situation to Selznick's (1949) study 
of the TVA. The steel mill "anticipated" certain problems which 
might arise in the community because of their arrival and attempted 
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to alleviate them by a variety of methods, one of which was cooptation. 
However, unlike the TVA, the steel mill was careful to exert their 
influence in a manner which could not be visibly traced. This 
strategy prevented the "compromise" of basic organizational principles 
which Selznick identifies with the TVA. 
The "object" of cooptation in Galaskiewicz's (1981) study, 
represents a reversal of most other studies. This study attempts 
to identify situations where a citizen's interest group might utilize 
cooptation to exert influence on a municipal government. Generally, 
research in cooptation has assumed that the "average" citizens or 
citizen's group is the most likely object of cooptation. The par-
ticular approach could provide an alternative way of studying the 
police controversy in Evanston. Could the Marywood groups be viewed 
as the "coopting" group and city officials as the coopted"? 
The present study will focus on the use of cooptation as a 
strategy of a city government aimed at controlling groups with interests 
contrary to municipal policy and as a response to the challenge of 
their support of the police chief despite opposition in the community. 
This approach will be utilized in view of the fact that Marywood did 
not receive any real, tangible concessions in this controversy. While 
this thesis represents a case study of political opposition at the 
local level, it attempts to place the grassroots community movement 
behind this controversy in the socio-political context of the 1970's 
and 1980's. Concern with crime and crime related issues is just one 
among many issues which urban social movements have embraced. Urban 
residents are becoming increasingly.active in the local political 
arena. 
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This increased involvement in community affairs can be attributed 
to two general societal conditions. First, the revitalization of urban 
neighborhoods and communities has become a pervasive phenomena in 
contemporary social life. Some theorists maintain that in order to 
mobilize and maintain the.political participation of citizens, the 
issues at hand must have some relevance to their everyday lives 
(Flacks, 1976; Boyte, 1980). Community concern over an escalating 
crime rate is such an issue. 
A second factor contributing to the resurgence of local political 
behavior is related to the political, social and particularly the 
economic conditions which are impinging on an increasing porportion 
of the American population. Community protest can be placed within 
a Nee-Marxist framework which views the dominant institutions as 
propagating the ideology and values of society as a whole. When 
analyzing community protest at the local level, the impact of the 
dominant values of the society at large must be taken into consideration. 
Local power structures themselves represent "mini versions" of these 
dominant institutions. When situations arise such as the crime con-
troversy in Evanston, community protestors can represent basic threats 
to these dominant values. Community group leaders represent "mediators" 
between community residents and city administration. This study is 
concerned with the link between community leaders and the city 
administration and the strategies employed by city administration 
to neutralize community opposition and protest through these 
community leaders. 
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CHAPTER III 
A CASE STUDY OF INTEREST GROUP POLITICS: PARTICIPATING ORGANIZATIONS 
Evanston is a North Shore suburb of Chicago composed of a popula-
tion of approximately 73,000 people. It shares many characteristics 
of other suburban areas (largely residential in composition. Large 
sectors of middle and upper class residents, high median incomes, 
etc). Evanston is a stable, attractive city which offers a reputable 
community atmosphere for middle income families. As such, it represents 
the comparable life style of such North Shore communities as Wilmette 
and Kenilworth at more affordable prices. Evanston has the particular 
attribute of sharing its Southern border with Chicago. This provides 
Evanstonians with all the conveniences of a large city, without the 
rapid pace and congestion of Chicago. Sharing a border with Chicago 
also disconcerts some residents because of the fear that Chicago street 
gangs and criminals will also take advantage of this easy access. 
Evanston also represents a community which has a solid reform 
government and a good financial rating in the bond market. City 
administration is carried out largely through the combined efforts of 
the city council, the mayor and the city manager. Evanstonians are 
active in civic affairs and frequently make use of alderpersons when 
they are in need of community problem resolution. Alderpersons in 
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turn are responsive to the needs of residents and make every effort to 
solve problems brought to their attention. Evanston offers residents 
the opportunity and satisfaction of participating in community affairs 
which shape their everyday lives but at the same time offers the 
cosmopolitan attraction of being located near a major city. 
During the past decade Evanston has changed with regards to 
several basic population characteristics. The last ten years has 
seen a population decrease of approximately 8%. As would be expected 
this decrease in population represents a decline in the overall tax 
base. The tax base provided by the industrial and commercial sectors 
has also declined dramatically. As a result, city officials have 
concentrated on making the downtown area of Evanston more attractive 
and on urging Evanston merchants to remain in Evanston. 
Another population change in the past ten years which deserves 
attention is the racial composition of Evanston. The non-white popula-
tion has increased by 10%, while the white population has decreased by 
a full 15%. The black community has increased by 22% while the Spanish 
speaking community has increased by 23%. These changes represent major 
shifts for a relatively stable community and have caused some concern 
among residents. These shifts become even more dramatic if one were 
to look closely at the particular areas of the city effected by these 
changes. 
Inspite of the many positive characteristics which Evanston 
possesses, residents have become increasingly self-conscious of their 
communities. This is partially due to the population changes noted 
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above. Since a large sector of Evanston's population is young middle 
class families, these families have a vested interest in maintaining 
or improving the quality of life in their neighborhoods. One of the 
issues which this increasing concern has centered around is that of 
crime and crime related activities. Evanston has been the site of a 
growing problem with burglaries and thefts, as have many urban areas. 
While the crime rate has steadily been climbing since the 1960's, in 
1979 a dramatic increase occurred in the crime categories of burglary 
and theft. Evanston represents an area which contains a concentration 
of families that can afford items which can be easily dispensed with 
in the black market. While other areas such as Wilmette and Kenilworth 
have much higher concentrations of wealth, these areas also commonly 
invest in elaborate protective devices. This is generally not the 
case in Evanston. In addition to the increasing rates of reported 
crime drawing community attention, the quality and quantity of services 
provided by the Evanston Police Department also has become a contro-
versial issue. 
In the Fall of 1979 residents in the community surrounding the 
Evanston Civic Center became concerned about what they perceived as 
the rising rate of crime in their immediate area, as well as the rest 
of Evanston. These residents formed a new community group called the 
Marywood Neighbors Association. The concern this group voiced about 
burglary in particular was based on crime reports in the Evanston Re-
view, interaction with neighbors who had actually been victims of 
burglary and vicarious information gleaned through third parties. Mary-
wood began to voice its concerns at city council meetings. These con-
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cerns were in turn echoed by several alderpersons who claimed to have 
been concerned about police service and effectiveness for some time. 
In the early part of 1980 the concerns of these residents began to 
center around the Evanston Police Department. They began to question 
why there had been such a dramatic increase in burglary (and crime in 
general) during the year 1979. They concluded that the responsibility 
for the rising burglary rate rested on the EPD--they simply were not 
efficiently and effectively doing their job. Ultimately the blame came 
to rest on Chief William McHugh's shoulders. The chief was thought to 
be incompetent--specifically, it was claimed that he had lost his 
effectiveness as a leader after eleven years on the job; he was out of 
touch with modern police technology; he had become increasingly removed 
. 
and inaccessible to the rank and file of the department; had suffered 
severe health problems several years previously, and he was seen to 
exhibit socially inappropriate behavior in the public arena. 
Through the presentation of community demands and concerns voiced 
in council meetings and the coverage of these issues by the Suburban 
Tribune and the Evanston Review, crime, the effectiveness of the police 
department and the competency of the chief became major issues of 
debate in the community. 
This study will trace the resources available and the courses of 
action chosen by the four major organizations involved in this expres-
sion of social protest. These four organizations are the municipal 
city government, the city police department, the media, and the 
principle community group involved--the Marywood Neighbors Association. 
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Following this historical presentation, this study will then concentrate 
on the evolution and analysis of the Residential Crime Prevention 
Committee (RCPC) and its hypothesized use in a cooptive strategy em-
ployed by city administration. 
Community Groups 
Despite claims of the Evanston Review in its coverage of this 
controversy that various community groups were challenging the admin-
istrative competency of the chief and the organizational effectiveness 
of the police department, only one community group was ever identified 
by name as being behind this opposition. This group was known as the 
Marywood Neighbors Association. The neighborhood which this group 
represents is located around the 2100 block of Ridge Avenue in central 
Evanston which involves the area surrounding the Civic Center itself. 
This area had seen a dramatic increase in crime, particularly burglary. 
The concern of this group appears to have at least three sources. 
First, there were the actual experiences of persons who had been 
burglarized. The city as a whole had seen a dramtic increase in 
burglary and theft during the year of 1979 and the Marywood area was 
no exception. 
The second source of concern about crime came from persons who 
knew other persons who had been victimized. A third source was 
vicarious information gleaned in the form of rumor. This source of 
fear represents a much more difficult source of influence to trace, 
but yet has a distinct impact on the perceptions of citizens. 
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Marywood had two prominent leaders who ~arne to the forefront in 
the crime controversy. These leaders were Daniel Garrison and Daniel 
Whitemore. Garrison proved to be the more aggressive and articulate 
leader of the group. It was Garrison who began to frequent city council 
meetings and began to raise concern about the escalating crime rate and 
subsequently the competency of the chief of police and the organiza-
tional effectiveness of the police department as a functional depart-
ment of the city administration. Whitemore directed efforts towards 
writing editorals and letters for the Evanston Review and attempts to 
mobilize larger portions of the Evanston community. 
Resources 
In analyzing the number and strength of the resources available 
to the Marywood community group, several resources can be identified 
in their presentation of demands to the city administration. The first 
and probably most common method of citizen involvement in Evanston is 
general access to individual alderpersons. Citizens would contact the 
appropriate alderperson when they had an issue or concern which needed 
the intervention or attention of the city administration. This is a 
widely used technique of involvement. As an employee at EPD, the 
author frequently received communications from the Assistant City 
Manager, Joe Asprooth, which had been referred to him by an alderperson. 
It would then be expected that action be taken on these situations by 
either investigating or rectifying the situation. The city manager's 
office was conscientious about forwarding such problems to the approp-
riate departments and requesting feedback for the citizen involved. 
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A second resource open to a community group involved direct access 
to the city council itself or indirect access to the council through 
an alderperson. This process then would bypass the city manager's 
office. The city manager's office typically did not approve of this 
tactic because it left that office in the defensive position of ex-
plaining the situation to the council or having to investigate the 
situation when first hand knowledge of the complaint was not possessed. 
The third resource which a community group has in a "reform" type 
of government (Galaskiewicz,_ 1981) is the fact that the city manager, 
unlike the mayor of Chicago, has no political "machine" or apparatus to 
support him. In the case of Evanston, the city manager played a very 
prominent role investigating and presenting options that the council 
might take to solve specific problems. Since the city manager's job in-
valves full time efforts geared towards the administration of city 
resources, a great deal of the responsibility for decisions rests on his 
shoulders. 
In the case of Evanston, the media represented perhaps the great-
est resource open to the community group. The media often become a 
source of legitimation and mobilization of larger public sentiments con-
cerning specific issues (Holotch, 1979). In this particular case, the 
Evanston Review proved to be a valuable resource to the Marywood Neigh-
bars in publicizing their concerns and demands and in creating enough 
contoversy that the city administration was forced to respond to their 
charges. The role of the media shall be discussed in a later section. 
~ ,._ .-.., ,~ .. 
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Related to the fourth resource available to the community is the 
fact that the city manager had previously been criticized for perform-
ing his role in an extremely autocratic manager. The stage was thus 
set for an attack on the city manager as utilizing "undemocratic" tac-
tics in administering the resources of "their" city. 
Options/Alternatives for Action 
Conceptually, ;he resources available to a group of actors 
can be separated from the options or alternative courses of action 
available to attain organizational goals. However, in the case of the 
Evanston community groups, the alternative courses of action closely 
approximate the resources available to the groups and the separation 
of these two concepts becomes difficult in practice since the community 
group was presenting a criticism of a city administrative department. 
Since the city manager/council is legitimately responsible for over-
seeing the effective functioning of this department, the conmrunity group 
can be viewed as a force of opposition to city administration. Oppo-
sition to what is termed the "ruling elite" greatly reduces the resources 
available to the community group mainly because of the city government's 
possession of both the coercive and ideological means of social control. 
The city administration/police department is also in possession of vital 
information which could either refute or substantiate the charges and 
demands of the community group. Only the police department and to some 
extent the city manager, has the information which could substantiate 
the community claims of escalating crime problems and the organizational 
effectiveness of the police department itself. 
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In effectively combating the city's own possession of critical 
resources, it was necessary for the community group to expand their 
own patterns of influence in the community. This could effectively be 
done by mobilizing the sentiments or interests of the larger Evanston 
community. This type of mobilization could be accomplished in two 
ways. First, the community group could go out into the community and 
attempt to involve other residents in the controversy. However, in 
terms of cost-effectiveness this tactic could prove impractical since 
a large social base was necessary to exert pressure on the city manager/ 
city council it was unlikely that this strategy alone could mobilize 
a substantial portion of the population quickly enough to keep the 
issue alive. 
A second option which the community ~roup had open to it was the 
use of the media in publicizing their group interests and eliciting 
enough support to apply pressure on the city administration. In the 
course of their opposition, the Marywood Neighbors were successful in 
pressuring the city council to appropriate $20,000 for a study to be 
done within the police department to determine organizational and ad-
ministrative effectiveness. 
Once the community group was successful in having funds appro-
priated for the Police Management Study, Daniel Garrison was appointed 
to the ad hoc committee responsible for drawing the guidelines and 
awarding the research grant. This accomplishment seems unlikely with-
out the legitimization of interest group demands by the Evanston 
Review. In essence, members of Marywood exerted influence on this pro-
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cess in two ways. First, they applied direct pressure on the city 
council, placing the city manager in a defensive position with the 
council. Previous criticisms of Martin's administrative techniques 
coupled with the fact that several alderpersons already had concerns 
regarding the efficiency and effectiveness of the police department 
made the possibility of simply ignoring the charges a politically un-
wise decision. Secondly, by making the issue a city wide controversy 
in the media, indirect pressure was applied to the city manager. 
The Media 
The question must now be asked -- how did the concerns and demands 
of a relatively small community (interest) group become a matter of 
broader public concern? Or did they? It is fairly common for specific 
interest groups to approach the city council (especially in a suburban 
community such as Evanston), with issues they consider salient to the 
community. The question here is why did the interest of the group be-
come so well publicized and how did they come to move the city manager's 
office to respond. To answer this question, discussion will now turn 
to the role which the media (specifically the Evanston Review) played 
in this process. 
The Evanston Review is a weekly community newspaper published by 
Pioneer Press, a subsidiary of Time-Life, Inc. Pioneer Press is based 
in Wilmette and publishes community newspapers in a number of north 
shore communities. The Evanston Review is the only local newspaper 
published explicitly for Evanston residents. 
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In the Fall of 1979, the Evanston Review began to publish articles 
"documenting the development of the Marywood Neighbors group and the 
concerns which they had begun to articulate". The author of these 
articles was Frank Santos, who was at this time municipal reporter for 
1 
the paper. In article after article, Santos emphasized that 11Community 
groups" in Evanston were becoming agitated by the rising crime rate and 
were presenting their demands for increased manpower and the removal 
of McHugh as chief of police. Santos always used the plural term groups 
when reporting this process, however, not once did he mention the names 
of any other community group except Marywood Neighbors. The pluraliza-
tion of "community groups" served to give legitimacy to the concerns of 
the Marywood group. 
It is hypothesized that the Evanston Review and Frank Santos as 
the reporter/writer of these articles, played a very prominent role in 
publicizing Marywood's concerns with crime and the community's percep-
tions about the extent of the problem and where the focus of responsi-
bility for these problems lies. 
In the early part of 1981 Santos received a promotion and transfer 
to be editor of the Wilmette paper. It appears as though his pursuit 
and exploitation of the controversy over EPD had "paid off.". Lt. 
MacMillan (Santos inside source at EPD) firmly believed that the city 
manager's office had a great deal to do with Santos' transfer to Wil-
1 
Santos was promoted to city editor in June 1980. He was later trans-
ferred to the Wilmette Life and named editor in November 1980. 
mette, the purpose being to take the "heat" off the police chief 
and subsequently the heat off the city manager as a supporter of the 
chief. 
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The purusal of two years worth of Evanston Review articles on this 
issue supports the hypothesis that the crime rate and the competency 
of the police chief would not have been issues of great import in the 
community without the coverage of the Evanston Review. A comparison 
in the content and number of articles about EPD and McHugh during Santos' 
employment at the Evanston Review and in the period since his transfer 
indicate a change in reporting style. If this controversy was as heat-
ed as Santos would portray, why didn't any remaining reporters at the 
Evanston Review pick up on this after Santos' transfer? It seems clear 
that in this case, the media had a great deal to do with giving legit-
imacy to the newly formed Marywood Neighbors Association as the "voice" 
of the Evanston community and in making the city council take some in-
vestigating action on the matter. In essence, the Evanston Review 
transformed a "mini social movement" into a situation where a citizen's 
group was in a position to threaten the city administration. 
In investigating the possibility that the Evanston Review played 
a prominent role in transforming the concerns of a small percentage of 
the population into a city wide controversy, we must ask what the Evan-
ston Review stood to gain from such coverage. First, since Evanston 
is a relatively small community (in the shadow of Chicago), it does not 
have many local stories to choose from in creating eye catching head-
lines. Since reporters are constantly under pressure to produce 
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articles, the "creation" of a community controversy surrounding crime 
gave a relatively low key community newspaper sensationalism and a long 
running feature story. It also served to create a "dialogue" between 
different members of the community. Numerous articles/letters in the 
"Letters to the Editor" column involved the expression of different 
points of view about the police department and the escalating crime 
rate. Two main actors in the Marywood Neighbors Association frequent-
ly had letters published in the column. On several occasions, letters 
commending actions of the Evanston Police Department were also published, 
one even accused Marywood of political muckraking. However, the number 
of articles or letters condemning the Evanston Police Department, the 
chief and the city manager for the crime problem far outnumbered the 
positive letters. 
Another consideration in looking at the Evanston Review's role 
in the crime issue was the personal interests of the reporter Frank 
Santos. Several persons at EPD voiced the opinion that Santos was 
interested in stirring up trouble to further his own career. Santos 
came in on a daily basis to read and take notes on the daily police 
bulletin which was produced in the Record Section. The crimes which 
were typed on the bulletin were first selected on a priority basis 
by the Record Section--all crimes were not placed on the bulletin. The 
most serious crimes were placed on there with special restrictions 
being applied to crimes such as murder, rape and arson. Santos went 
through his own selection process when he published these reports in 
the Evanston Review. He would frequently attempt to get more detailed 
information about particular crimes from the Detective Section. 
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It was common knowledge at EPD that Lt. Kip MacMillan, who had 
just been moved from commander of the detective section to commander of 
the youth section, was Santos' "inside source" for the articles he 
wrote on the internal problems and dissension at the Evanston Police 
Department. MacMillan himself admitted in an indirect way on one 
occasion, that this was the case. MacMillan hoped to instigate a mild 
"internal insurrection" which could feed on the external conflict 
generated in the community. MacMillan proposed the appointment of 
Captain William Logan, the only black ranking officer at EPD, as the 
new chief with the new position of Deputy Chief created for himself. 
As previously pointed out, the black community in Evanston comprises 
22% of the total population. When McHugh was appointed chief in 1969, 
the black community had clamored for the appointment of a black police 
chief. MacMillan (and indeed many others in the city) felt that the 
time was now ripe for such an appointment to occur. As a Lieutenant 
MacMillan had very little chance of ever being appointed chief through 
normal promotional procedures. Four captains were above him in rank 
and he shared the rank of lieutenant with approximately ten other 
officers. 
MacMillan's ploy for insurgency was unsuccessful for two reasons. 
First, he did not have sufficient support within the organization. In 
fact MacMillan was not liked by many officers within the organization 
(among the ranking officers as well as the rank and file). Secondly, 
his strategy was unsuccessful because in January of 1981, a black fire 
chief had been appointed by the city manager. This appointment followed 
the dismissal of a white fire chief. The former fire chief had been 
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fired because he refused to promote black officers within the fire de-
partment. 
During this period, Alderman Jack Korshak began to voice strong 
opposition to Chief McHugh and EPD in general. Korshak used this 
controversy as a springboard for subsequent challenges of Martin's 
authority and decision making. He later entered in the 1981 mayoral 
race against the incumbent mayor. Jay Lytle but was defeated. Korshak 
made the crime rate, the police chief and the EPD crucial issues in his 
mayoral campaign. This served to keep the controversy going for an 
additional period of time. Korshak's campaign also presented a possible 
threat to Martin's position for Korshak posed the threat of being 
a strong adversary of Martin's. If Korshak were elected mayor, Martin's 
authoritarian control would loosen and if Korshak were successful in 
gaining council support, Martin could conceivably be ousted from his 
job. Martin therefore had a vested interest in placating the concerns 
being voice about the EPD. Martin responded to this situation in a 
variety of ways. This will be discussed in detail in the subsection 
entitled "Municipal City Government". 
Municipal Police Department 
In discussing the Evanston Police Department, two levels of 
analysis will be utilized. These levels will be the organization, as 
a whole and the discussion of individual members as they pertain or 
play a role in the community controversy at hand. This section will 
focus on the role of the police department as an organization in this 
controversy. The role of individual members will be discussed later. 
The EPD has a history of providing outstanding service to the 
community. This history is presented on one entire wall of the lobby 
where commendations and achievement awards from various nationally 
recognized law enforcement agencies are displayed. The EPD has been 
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a department of national acclaim for both its service and level of 
technology during the 1960's. It was the contention of some members of 
the community, the media and members of EPD itself, that both the 
quality of the serivce provided and organizational effectiveness had 
greatl~r declined in the twenty year interim. As the police controversy 
gained in intensity, the organizational problems attributed to EPD were 
more clearly stated. 
A content analysis of a two year span of Evanston Review news-
paper articles yielded three types of issues involved in this instance 
of social protest. These are community related issues, issues pertain-
ing to the competency of the chief and organizational problems of the 
police department itself. Responses from the city administration will 
also be analyzed on these same three levels. Community related issues 
consisted of a general community concern over the escalating crime rate, 
increasing incidents of burglary and of the general perception that 
neither the police chief or city administration were inherently in-
terested in the problems or issues of the community at large. 
The second general category of issues involved questions as to the 
actual competency of the administrative staff of EPD, specifically the 
chief of police, The following list summarizes the general attributes 
at question here: Does the chief have an acceptable level of "expert 
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knowledge" in terms of record keeping, crime prevention and apprehension 
technologies? Is the chief an effective leader in both the police 
department and the community ~s a whole? Does the chief have the 
ability and capacity to make effective decisions with regards to the 
organization of the department, the setting of departmental policy and 
the implementation of these procedures? Does the chief exhibit behavior 
which would be considered socially inappropriate for a city official 
in public places--specifically in the form of public drunkeness or 
public outbursts of .anger? Lastly, is the chief physically capable of 
2 
holding the office of police .chief? 
The third type of criticism leveled at the EPD surrounded specific 
organizational problems. This category was comprised of the problems 
considered most crucial by community leaders, the media, and members of 
EPD itself. This category of criticism can be further delineated into 
three main types. These types may be described as organizational pro-
blems involving the chief's interaction with the rank and file and other 
members of the organization, problems involving the appropriation of 
adequate resources (manpower and material) and the chief's perceived 
lack of independence from the city manager. 
With regard to the interactions between the chief and other or-
ganizational members the following points were raised: the chief 
failed to communicate effectively with the rank and file, hold the 
2 
The chief had suffered a massive stroke from which he had not been 
expected to recover and had undergone heart surgery to repair a 
blockage following this. 
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rank and file accountable for departmental procedures, allow appropri-
ate rank and file input into the decision making of his administration, 
the increasing separation of the administrative staff from the "cop" 
on the street and the existence of a select group of personal ufav-
orites" on the part of the chief. Criticisms surrounding the acqui-
sition and allocation of resources were aimed more at the level of city 
administration rather than aimed specifically at the chief of police. 
This category of criticism was based on the perception that the police 
department did not possess adequate manpower, financial and techno-
logical resources. Having briefly outlined the community, administra-
tive, and organizational problems which were attributed to the police 
department, in the following section the resources available to the 
police department in reaction to these charges will be discussed. 
Organizational Resources in Combating Controversy 
In analyzing the resources available to the police department 
the discussion shall center around the resources available to the 
chief of police as the administrator of the police department. The 
primary resource available to the chief was his direct access to the 
city manager. The chief, as a departmental head was in a position to 
interact and communicate on a regular basis with the city manager. In-
ternally, the chief was believed to do just what the city manager told 
him to do--a situation not considered proper by many sworn personnel 
believing that civilians were not in a position to understand nor make 
decisions on police matters. The chief was regarded as a rather "power-
less" department head by both insiders and outsiders. This was mainly 
45 
in terms of his interaction with the city manager and other department 
heads in the vying for distribution of city resources. 
Direct access to the city manager provided the chief with a means 
for presenting his point of view and influencing the course of action 
taken by the city manager. This also meant that the chief was in a 
position to present as much or as little relevant information to the 
city manager as he considered proper in arguing his case. It was well 
known at EPD that the chief did not want the city manager to know about 
the organizational problems plaguing the department. The chief fre-
quently withheld information that could be damaging either to the de-
partment or to his ability to run it. 
A second resource available to the chief was his control over the 
formal organizational contacts of the department with the media and 
the public at large. He could and did limit the crime statistical 
information released to both the public and the media. Contributing 
to this limitation, however, was the fact that the Record Section 
could not effectively and efficiently produce the type of information 
frequently requested. This formal control of public contacts with 
departmental personnel made many organizational members apprehensive 
in voicing any opinions or in releasing any information concerning de-
partmental procedures. 
The main aspect of this resource which the chief failed to ex-
ploit was the role of the community in reducing both the fear of crime 
and in preventing crime. Access to the community was an avenue that he 
chose not to deal with in responding to the controversy. He might 
have been in a better position to counteract the media and community 
group efforts to replace him, had he used the same strategy that the 
community had in mobilizing public opinion. 
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The third resource available to the chief is closely tied to the 
above mentioned resource. The chief had formal control over the dis-
semination of departmental information. This included crime statistics, 
procedures, goals, and future plans. The chief chose the strategy of 
cutting off all information emanating from the department to the public 
or the media. He chose instead to present a hostile attitude towards 
reporters from the Evanston Review and community groups when they re-
quested specific crime information about their areas. He regarded these 
requests as personal afronts to his integrity and the department's. If 
the chief had been more willing to cooperate with concerned citizens 
and enlist their help in combating the crime problem and the fear of 
crime, much of the fervor of the controversy might have been drained off. 
A fourth resource which became available to the chief in the early 
stages of the controversy was the inception of "expert knowledge in the 
form of a new Director of Planning and Research. While this Director 
did have considerable influence on the chief, he would have been used 
more effectively as a buffer between the chief and the community. Since 
the Director had considerable experience in research concerning community 
participation, the phenonmena of fear of crime, and the crime analysis, 
his skills could have been better utilized in the direction of community 
relations. 
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Options/Alternative Courses of Action 
Having been placed in the center of a political controversy, 
the chief had two main alternatives open to him. First, he could make 
an effort to involve the community in solving organizational and com-
munity related police problems. Secondly, he could choose to deny the 
existence of these problems and deal with the community groups as an 
adversary. He chose the second alternative in dealing with the con-
troversy. 
The chief was openly hostile to community groups requesting in-
formation from his office and adopted a defensive posture when the press 
attempted to gather information for its feature stories. Having chosen 
to view the community groups openly as adversaries, he precluded the 
possibility of neutralizing the criticisms of the police department by 
working with the community to alleviate its concerns and fears. 
Municipal City Government 
In discussing the role the city government played in the crime/ 
police department controversy, analysis shall be restricted to the office 
of the city manager and how his responses served to neutralize the pro-
test of the community. The municipal government in Evanston represents 
what is termed a "reform'' government (Galaskiewicz, 1981). As opposed 
to a city like Chicago where governmental affairs are controlled by a 
federation of politicians elected by neighborhood constituencies ( or 
more precisely the democratic machine), Evanston's affairs are admini-
stered by a small core of experts. The office of mayor is an elected 
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office but possesses very little real power. This office serves as the 
official spokesperson for the city. It is not clear whether this lack 
of mayoral influence is due to the constitution of the reform govern- · 
ment or the result of the dominant influence of the City Manager, Edward 
Martin. It could be speculated that it is a combination of both in-
fluences. Galaskiewcz (1981) maintains that "because reform politicians 
do not have a political organization to shield them they are more vul-
nerable to outside influence" (Galaskiewcz, 1981: 265). In the same 
vein other writers (Bonfield and Wilson, 1963; Smith, 1979; Lowi, 1964; 
Dye and Garcia, 1978), contend that these reform governments secure the 
support of their constituencies by exchanging public goods and services 
for acquiescence, synthesizing these compromises in terms of dominant 
societal values. It is from this point of view that discussions of the 
city manager's responses will be approached. 
Among city employees Martin has a reputation for being a compe-
tent authoritarian manager. At the time the controversy began he had 
been manager for nine and one half years, and had been credited with 
balancing the city's fiscal budget. 
Martin typically was able to sway the city council his way on 
issues that required their approval. When the charges against Chief 
McHugh were made public, Martin issued a strong statement in support 
of the chief, however, the council was not willing to accept Martin's 
assurances without some investigation of the EPD. The resources 
available to the city will now be discussed with a detailed discussion 
of responses following. 
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Resources 
Martin's greatest resource in dealing with the criticisms of Mary-
wood was his direct access to the city council. Even in light of the 
concern expressed by some council members, Martin was still in a pos-
ition to present evidence and information to influence the decisions 
and sympathies of council members. In a reform government such as that 
exemplified in Evanston, the city manager's position is a full time pro-
fessional job requiring specific skills. City council members and the 
mayor are part time employees of the city who spread their energies be-
tween full time employment elsewhere and their community concerns as 
alderpersons. Martin devotes all of his energy and time to the business 
of administering the city resources. It therefore can be concluded that 
he is in a better position to present information which would support 
his recommendations to the council. He also is more likely to antici-
pate the broader implications of actions taken by the council for the 
city as a whole. 
A second resource of Martin's was his authority to fire or force 
a resignation from the police chief. This was not a resource he chose 
to excercise but it was an alternative available. Closely related to 
this resource is Martin's ability to formally and informally effect 
the chief's decisions in administering the police department and in re-
acting to the controversy surrounding him. During this time period it 
was very apparent that the chief made few moves without the explicit 
approval or sanction of the city manager. It can be hypothesized 
that the city manager had a great deal to do with the chief's choice 
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of strategies in dealing with the charges lodged against him. This 
strong influence which Martin had over the chief's decisions effective-
ly gave him control over the police department itself. 
A third resource available to the city manager pertains to the 
access of information relative to the organizational problems and the 
crime information at the police department. The city manager had the 
advantage of being able to peruse city information which the community 
groups did not have access to. This put him in a better position to 
respond to charges. In Pfeffer's (1978) terms, Martin effectively 
reduced the uncertainty factor for the city administration, while in-
creasing the uncertainty factor expressed by the community groups. 
In addition to having access to more information, Martin also had 
the added resource of having control over how that information was dis-
seminated to other city employees, the city council, and the public. 
Control of this information could be crucial in building a case which 
refutes the charges made by the community group. Martin could effect-
ively "pick and choose" information which would be released to direct 
attention away from legitimate problems which could be a source of 
embarrassment for him and his administration. 
The authority of the city manager as administrator for the city 
also placed formal means of social control at his disposal. Coercive 
tactics could have been employed with such things as disruptive in-
stances occuring at council meetings, etc. As city manager, Martin 
1 II II • a so had access to funds to be used to stifle soc~al protest. 
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Options/Alternative Courses of Action 
The reader will recall, this controversy grew out of the Marywood 
Neighbors Association's concern about the escalating crime rate in Evan-
ston and the media coverage of these concerns and the actions of this 
group in presenting these issues to the city council. As the strength 
of these concerns became intensified by the media, the city manager was 
the object of pressure from various sources. First, he was under pres-
sure from the community at large to make some response and take some 
action to investigate _charges that had been made against the police de-
partment. Secondly, he was being pressured by the city council to pro-
vide evidence that the charges made against the police department were 
not true and that measures were being taken to rectify any problems 
found in this investigation. Thirdly, with the mayoral elections coming 
up in the Spring of 1981, Martin had a vested interest in assuring both 
the community and the city council that such organizational and admin-
istrative problems did not exist in the police department. 
Discussion will now proceed to a delineation of the three direct-
ions which Martin's responses to the police controversy took. These 
directions are depicted in Figure 1. These responses correspond to thP 
three types of issues which the community and the media addressed as be-
ing characteristic of EPD. 
First of all the city manager had the option of supporting or 
opposing the chief of police under the attack of the community and 
media. Martin openly supported the chief in reaction to the charges 
Community 
Group 
City ~ 
Manager ~ 
Police 
Chief 
Residential 
Sector 
Educational 
Sector 
I 
FIGURE 1 
Media 
City 
Council 
Community 
Based 
Crime 
Prevention 
Grant 
~ I 
l 
Police 
Services 
Committee 
City Manager 
Council 
Responses 
I Organizational 
I 
52 
Chief 
53 
made by the media, community groups and the personnel in the police 
department itself. In the initial furor of these charges, Martin 
stated that "I've no thoughts of asking the chief to resign. As far 
as I'm concerned, he is doing the job" (Evanston Review, February 7, 
1980: 14). Throughout the whole debate about the police department 
which ensued over the next year and brought the subsequent retirement 
of McHugh, Martin never relinquished his initial support of the chief. 
In April of 1980 a series of articles (three) appeared in the 
Suburban Tribune which posed serious charges against the Evanston 
Police Department, its management by Chief McHugh and the ultimate 
responsibility of Martin as city manager (and the powerful decision 
maker believed to be behind many of McHugh's moves as chief). These 
charges included many of those prev1ously mentioned in the discussion 
of the police department earlier in this chapter. Among these were 
charges of low morale among the rank and file which was proported to 
be the basis of another charge against the effectiveness and efficiency 
of the patrol section. Other charges were geared towards the absence 
of investigative procedures for the large volume of burglary cases and 
the lack of adequate departmental resources. 
Following the Suburban Tribune series, the city manager and the 
chief declined comment on the issues raised and stated that they would 
carry out separate investigations to determine if there was any truth 
to the allegations. However, both community groups and members of the 
city council requested that the Police Management Study include an in-
vestigation of the charges made in these articles. Martin called a 
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special meeting of the city council to discuss the series and promised 
to submit a report in response to the charges and stated that he ex-
pected the management audit to pursue those charges also. 
Public Responses 
Responses from the city council were varied. Some council mem-
bers felt the problems at EPD to be symptomatic of the city management 
(Martin) rather than the sole blame of the chief. One alderperson 
stated that she "was glad to see it written. I have long felt that the 
Evanston Police Department needed some looking into. Ed (Martin) always 
has been very defensive of the police department as though it were his 
private domain" (Suburban Tribune, April 28, 1980). Others were not 
confident the Tribune series had reliable sources but also felt that 
some attention should be paid to the matter. Members of the Marywood 
Association had strong reactions to these articles. Garrison stated 
that the series "provided a very clear background against which any 
(management study) investigator is going to have to work (Suburban 
Tribune, April 28, 1980). Whitmore, also a member of the same group, 
stated that he was "disappointed, very depressed" by the series and 
that he "didn't realize that the problems were that severe. It's 
just like we're helpless" (Suburban Tribune, April 28, 1980). 
On May 5, 1980, Ed Martin issued his response to the series of 
articles in the Suburban Tribune concerning the police department. 
Martin's response grouped the issues raised by the series into five 
main categories. These consisted of: Police activity, manpower issues, 
55 
the adequacy and behavior of the support systems, equipment questions, 
and morale. 
Internal Responses 
A second response initiated by Martin pertained to the internal 
dynamics of EPD. Both the Suburban Tribune and Santos had expounded 
on the internal problems of EPD based on information from an unnamed 
"inside source". Numerous reports appeared in the Suburban Tribune 
and Evanston Review citing dissension between ranking officers, the 
rank and file and the chief. The chief was accused of being authori-
tarian in his method of administration and being so far removed from 
the rank and file that he had no awareness of the problems faced by 
officers on the street nor did they have any input into policy making. 
The chief was directly accused of running the department staff meetings 
in a purely autocratic manner leaving no room for comment or question-
ing. It had been remarked to the author on several occasions that 
supervisors had learned a lesson when asking questions or making 
comments during these meetings. Officers had been the object of ex-
tremely angry verbal attacks until it got to the point that there was 
no input from supervisors during these meetings at all. 
Following the publication of these newspaper articles, the 
city manager held a special staff meeting with the chief and his rank-
ing staff where internal problems were to be brought to light. These 
events took place prior to the author's employment at EPD. From the 
time the author started attending these meetings, the tone was dif-
ferent than what had been described as taking place in earlier meetings. 
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Interviews with officers who attended this meeting indicated that Ed 
Martin was concerned with the charges lodged in these newspaper articles 
and believed that these problems could be "worked" out. It was ob-
vious that Martin took the internal complaints about EPD and the chief 
serious enough to make an overt attempt at a solution. 
Also during this time period, plans to "reorganize" the police 
department were made public. The Detective Section had been the 
brunt of much criticism in the handling of burglary cases. The 
commander of this section was moved to the Youth Section (Lt •. Mac-
Millan--Santos' "secret" source) and a captain was moved up from patrol 
to head the Investigative Section. This was the major change among a 
series of minor changes instituted by the chief. 
Martin had originally proposed allocating additional funds to 
expand the police force in the fiscal year to begin in March 1980. 
However, constraints placed on the municipal budget in the form of a 
decreasing tax base (both a decrease in local businesses and popula-
tion) and spiraling demands for public services forced him to with-
draw this budgetary proposal. It is spoken here as though Martin has 
exclusive and final authority over the city budget. Formally, the 
budget is subject to the formal consent of the mayor and aldermanic 
vote, however, Martin was thorough in many proposals put before the 
council and was usually quite successful in getting what he wanted 
from the council. A portion of the money originally to be allocated 
for increased manpower ($20,000) was set aside for the Police Manage-
ment Study requested by Marywood. 
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The final budget included a plan to "civilianize" several 
supervisory positions held by ranking police personnel. The division 
between sworn personnel and civilian personnel at EPD (and from the 
literature this is true in other police departments and military 
organizations) is a schism of great magnitude--sworn personnel con-
sist of all police personnel who have taken the oath to serve and pro-
tect the public and who are vested with the power to arrest. Civilian 
staff consisted basically of clerical positions prior to 1980. They 
were not organized in a military ranking system although they were 
bound by the General Orders put forth by the chief and were expected 
to abide by the "chain of connnand" in formal departmental matters. 
At the time of the departmental controversy, three positions 
were scheduled to become civilian posts. These positions were 1) 
the Director of Planning and Research 2) the Property Officer and 
3) the Supervisor of Records. Three main objectives were met by this 
process. First, it "freed" three ranking officers from desk jobs 
to return to street duty--the city manager's office and the chief 
then maintained that this in fact represented an "increase" in man-
power. It also brought "new blood" to EPD in the form of new civilians 
Lastly, it would eventually result in a salary savings because these 
sworn positions would be eliminated eventually by attrition. 
The above actions represent Martin's efforts to alleviate the 
"internal" pressures within the police department. Martin faced a 
double challenge with the police controversy because he had to deal 
with internal conflict as well as the external conflicts within the 
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the community. It is obvious from the number of strategies which 
were geared towards involvement or placating of the community, that 
Martin considered the external sources of conflict the greater threat 
to the stability of his administration. 
The Police Management Study 
Both Marywood's demand for an independent study of EPD and the 
doubts being voiced in the council chambers led to the appropriation 
of $20,000 for a management study of the police department. Marywood 
had originally demanded that the chief be demoted and assigned to a 
less stressful position at EPD. The management study was Martin's 
way of acknowledging the charges made against the chief without taking 
direct action. On February 23, 1980 the Police Services Committee 
named an ad hoc committee to formulate specific guidelines for both 
the content and selection of a research group to conduct the audit. 
The proponents of the management study encountered delays in the 
award of the study because of objections raised by Alderman Korshak. 
Korshak felt that the guidelines proposed by the ad hoc committee 
would not resolve the serious management problems which he believed 
to exist in the department. Korshak maintained that there was "per-
vasive evidence of a lack of discipline" and that "the command of 
Evanston is inadequate". Korshak called for "a good street wise cop" 
to investigate the Evanston Police. He maintained that in order to 
restore confidence in the EPD by the citizenry, the city council must 
be ready to take a more searching review of the command of the depart-
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ment. Korshak was successful in delaying the study for two months 
pending his submission of an alternative proposal. Korshak's proposal 
placed a stronger emphasis on studying the top command of the depart-
ment. Upon rejection of his proposal, Korshak was urged to join a 
subcommittee assigned to review bid submissions. The reader will re-
call that Korshak became a serious opponent of the incumbent mayoral 
candidate in the 1981 city elections, however, he was not successful 
in his candicacy. 
One June 26, 1980 an RFP for the management study was submitted 
by Alderperson Sherry Laycock, Chair of the Police Services Committee. 
The research grant was awarded to Research Management Associates, Inc., 
an independent research firm from Herndan, Virginia. The report was 
released in August 1981. The two person research team used a comb-
ination of several techniques for assessing the overall effective-
ness and efficiency of EPD. The report was a surprisingly low key 
analysis (or perhaps not so surprisingly). The report was suppose to 
be an assessment of the administration of top ranking personnel (most 
particularly the chief) and was also suppose to make recommendations 
for improvement. While this statement on the report will be relative-
ly general in nature, it should be pointed out that very little of 
the detailed information gathered throughout the project was included 
in the final report. Even more interesting is the fact that the re-
port had only positive things to say about McHugh when it was public 
knowledge within EPD that there was open hostility and disagreement 
between the research team and the chief of police. It is speculated 
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at this time, that the concept of the management study was viewed by 
the city manager as a means to placate community dissension while the 
chief instituted plans to retire at his 29th year service anniversary 
date (most probably a plan suggested and instituted by Martin to save 
face for both himself and the chief and let time and the furor pass 
so that it would not appear as though the chief was retiring under 
pressure but under his own volition.) 
Chief McHugh announced his retirement in May 1981 (to become 
effective September 30, 1981). This was mentioned in the management 
report along with a statement about the fact that McHugh's tenure as 
chief in Evanston was approximately three times the average tenure of 
police chiefs across the nation and that while he had done an admirable 
job, "new blood" was always a good thing for an organization. 
We can then identify this response (the management study) as a 
cooptive tactic employed by the city manager. For all appearances, a 
thorough organization analysis was being conducted of EPD along with 
an assessment of the management competency of the chief as requested 
by Marywood and the city council, with Martin in total control of the 
outcome or more specifically with the release of this information. 
The leaders of Marywood Neighbors had been "absorbed" into a steering 
committee in terms of producing the research proposal and their demands 
for the demotion or removal of the chief had effectively been neutralized. 
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The Comprehensive Crime Prevention Program 
In the early part of 1980 EPD had applied for a three year grant 
from the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission (ILEC) which was entitled 
the Comprehensive Community Crime Prevention Program. The program 
was funded for one year with subsequent funding contingent upon the 
submission of a summary report at the end of the first year. This 
grant was composed of several parts. First, one portion of research 
was geared towards an understanding and assessment of community groups 
in Evanston and the issues for which these groups had the greatest 
concern. 
Another section of the grant was devoted to the commercial sector 
and its crime problems. Westinghouse Evaluation Institute conducted 
a survey of Evanston merchants to determine both the rate of victim-
ization (apart from the reported crime rate), the major concerns of 
businesses and what they would like to see done in conjunction with 
the police department to reduce or prevent crime in the future. 
There is currently a commercial ~rime prevention program operating 
separately from the residential crime program which is the focus of 
this study. 
The third major subdivision of the grant pertains to education in 
the schools. Efforts are being made to incorporate this program into 
the curriculum to educate children as to the effects and responsib-
ilities of such criminal activities as vandalism, theft, and even 
curfew violation. This aspect of the program is also conducting a 
survey of juvenile delinquency where juveniles are asked (anonymously) 
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whether they had ever participated in such activities as smoking 
marijuana, stealing, graffti, vandalism, etc. While this program 
constitutes a major area of research, it too is not the subject of the 
present field work. This aspect of the project was co-directed by 
the Director of Planning and Research and Officer Kaminski of the 
Planning and Training Section. 
The Comprehensive Community Crime Prevention 5rant combines four 
separate research projects with three corresponding community based 
groups. Two of the four research projects were subcontracted out to 
independent research teams. The first project involved two surveys. 
One survey consisted of a random digit dialing of Evanston residents 
to determine the major issues of concern among city residents. The 
second aspect of this project involved the composition of a compre-
hensive list of community organizations and the selection of a rep-
resentative sample for a survey on issues and objectives of these groups. 
The purpose of this two fold project was to determine the salient 
issues and concerns of Evanston residents in general and of community 
organizations in particular. One clear objective of the study was 
to ascertain just how pervasive the fear of crime was in Evanston. 
The second research project involved a survey of commercial 
businesses designed to measure the pervasiveness of crime concerns in 
the commercial sector and the extent to which these commercial estab-
lishments were victimized by crime. 
A third research project was designed and implemented by the 
author in the record section. Burglary rates had risen dramatically 
in 1970 and appeared to be increasing in 1980. Since burglary was a 
major issue of the police department controversy, the Director of 
Planning and Research (Rosenbaum) and the author, decided to focus 
this part of the grant on investigating three aspects of the burglary 
problem in Evanston--the environment/social characteristics, the 
victim and the offender. Data were coded from the original police 
reports for one half of all residential burglaries and a total sample 
of commercial and other miscellaneously classified burglaries for the 
year 1980. The entire sample consisted of approximately 1400 cases. 
The results are expected to be released in May 1982. These results 
are to be made available to the Residential Crime Prevention Commit-
tee and are expected to have some input on the future direction of 
this committee's crime prevention program. 
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A fourth research project is to be carried out in the summer of 
1982. Data for this study are to be gleaned from an experimental 
dissemination of a community crime prevention newsletter. Newsletters 
containing community news, crime prevention tips and crime information 
are not new to crime prevention programs. This study seeks to empir-
ically measure the impact of a crime prevention letter on the behaviors 
of individual citizens exposed to specific crime information in their 
area (actual crime rates) and its possible indirect effects in reducing 
crime and increasing apprehension. 
This project ·is the prime responsibility of Rosenbaum (Director of 
Planning and Research and also a psychologist), and Lavrakas. While 
this project was initiated by the Residential Crime Prevention Commit-
tee as a whole, interviews with members of this committee and the 
author's observations revealed that this newsletter was not a high 
priority in their own goals for the committee and that Rosenbaum had 
succeeded in "pushing" che newsletter through the committee as the 
first project to be tackled. 
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The three organizations to come out of the crime prevention grant 
pertain to three sectors of influence--a commercial crime prevention 
committee, a residential crime preventional committee and an educational 
program instituted in the schools. The Residential Crime Prevention 
Committee is the prime focus of this paper because it represents a 
juncture of cooperation by the police department, city administration 
and concerned citizens groups. 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
Cooptation as a Survival Mechanism of Local Power Structure 
The original inclusion of the Residential Crime Prevention 
Committee in the grant application was a process independent of the 
media debate regarding the police chief and the police department. 
The grant was written six months to a year prior to the formation of 
the Marywood Neighbors Association and their subsequent activities 
with the city council. In contrast to Selznick's study of the coop-
tive process, it cannot therefore be stated that the conception of the 
crime prevention committee was a strategy employed to neutralize ££-
tential forces of resistence in the community. The committee was de-
signed to facilitate better community relations with police and to 
increase feelings of personal safety in the community at large. How-
ever, as the police controversy became full blown and the management 
capabilities of the police chief and ultimately the city manager came 
into question, the formation of this committee was cited as evidence 
of city efforts to deal with the crime issue. 
In his response made to the city council concerning the al-
legations made in the Suburban Tribune articles, Martin stated that: 
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As I re-read the articles, I was concerned and obviously angered 
at some of the innuendo and points raised and the overall impres-
sion given by the articles that Evanston is an antiquated, unpro-
fessional Police Department with men who don't care and wit~ no 
directions or tools to use. I do think it important to spend some 
time reminding the City Council and others of the leadership efforts 
our Department has been involved in ••••• In the very current climate 
you have the first major arrest of a terrorist group in the nation, 
the development of the Bicycle Enforcement Program Grant; the Crime 
Prevention Grant Program which is pending now before I.L.E.C.; the 
naming, just recently, of two Evanston Police Officers by the Com-
bined Counties Police Association as the "Officers of the Year," 
an award given by their peers throughout the entire organization; 
and the continuation of our existing programs; the recent civilian-
ization effort, which we all believe will make the operation more 
effective, as well as the utilization of Park Pat~ol Officers and 
the like. (City Memorandum, May 5, 1980). · 
In his 1980 statement of departmental objectives, McHugh stated 
that the "Endorsement of a grant application to the Illinois Law En-
forcement Commision" was one of the five parts of his program to 
strengthen the police department for the fiscal year 1981 (Evanston 
Review, February 7, 1980). 
In his presentation of the guidelines for the Police Management 
Study, Assistant City Manager, Joel Asprooth, again cited the 
Comprehensive Community Crime Prevention Program (CCCPP) as a part of 
the city's efforts at strengthening the police department. Accusa-
tions were made at the meeting by members of Marywood, that these 
guidelines were "vague" and "lacking specifics to determine the actual 
extent of criminal activity including victimization and the study of 
the public safety by other city departments 11 (Evanston Review, June 5, 
1980: 6). Asprooth responded to these reservations by pointing out 
that CCCPP would contain many of the answers to Marywood's questions. 
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Upon the actual awarding of the CCCPP, McHugh again stressed the 
fact to the Evanston Review, that the "focus of this program is to 
develop a stable partnership between the police department and many 
public and private organizations." Specifically, the programs expected 
to: 
• Develop and implement crime prevention strategies. 
• Reduce crime and juvenile delinquency. 
• Improve crime prevention skills of criminal justice personnel. 
• Develop community awareness and involvement in combatting crime 
and neighborhood security. 
• Develop educational strategies (Evanston Review, August 24, 
1980: 16). 
The CCCPP was also cited by the Director of Planning and Research 
as a crucial component of the development of good police-community re-
lations and in making Evanston "an example to other cities throughout 
the country that are facing the same crime problems" (Evanston Re-
view, April 30, 1981: 20A) 
As the above citations indicate, the actual conceptualization 
of the Residential Crime Prevention Committee (RCPC) was not ·initiated 
as a response to the demands of citizen concerns. Rather, it was en-
visioned as part of a comprehensive effort to plan a workable program 
by developing "a stable partnership between the police department and 
other public and private groups to reduce crime and the fear of crime 
in Evanston" (Evanston Review, July 24, 1980: 20A). It can therefore 
be concluded that the original intent of this program was not the 
cooptation or absorption of leaders of the community as a means of 
neutralizing social protest. However, as the community dialogue con-
cerning the police department, the police chief and crime intensified, 
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the development of the RCPC became an increasingly important adjunct 
of the city administration's efforts to appease citizen protest. 
Rosenbaum (the Director of Planning and Research) had been 
3 
involved in the grant application submitted in the early part of 1980. 
Prior to the first closed meeting of the RCPC, Rosenbaum was asked by 
this author, whether city hall or the city manager had been involved 
in these meetings in any way. He stated that the city manager's office 
had "expressed an interest in what would take place at these meetings 
and what their objectives would be". When asked whose idea the or-
ganization of these meetings was, he stated that it was his own and that 
it had been written into the crime prevention grant two years previous-
ly. 
The degree of importance which all involved organizations at-
tributed to the RCPC, has fluctuated in intensity at several points 
along the continuum of its conceptualization, evolution, and organiza-
tion. The original inclusion of the committee in the grant application 
was based on crime prevention programs developed in other municipalities 
as evidence by much of the crime prevention literature. At this 
point it was merely a neutral abstraction from both an academically 
and practically designed prevention program. However, as both the 
city administration and the police department felt compelled to "react" 
3 
This prior to his second employment at EPD. It was apparent at this 
point that Rosenbaum had a vested interest in the development and im-
plementation of these results as he was then an employee o:!: ~-:resting­
house Evaluation Institute, which was to be the recipient of one of 
the subcontracts of the research proposal. 
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to the concerns and demands of community residents, the idea of a com-
munity police based crime prevention committee took on new importance. 
As previously mentioned, the formation of this committee was offered 
by various city officials as a positive action geared towards the re-
solution of citizens' concerns. These events all took place prior to 
the announcement of McHugh's retirement in May of 1981. 
Following the chief's announcement that he would retire in 
September 1981, the administrators of the police department in par-
ticular and the· city in general became less interested in the par-
ticular functions of this committee. By the time the RCPC held its 
first closed door meeting in September o£ 1981, neither the chief nor 
the city manager were interested in this committee for the same reasons 
for which they had previously shown an interest. The political pres-
sure for the chief's resignation or replacement had disappeared because 
the chief had voluntarily forfeited his role by the fact of his retire-
ment. As previously discussed, this action was timed so as not to 
appear as an admission of "guilt" nor as a response to community pres-
sure. Also at this time, the Police Management Study was in full 
swing and thus another of the community demands had been realized (how-
ever superficial). At this point in time the RCPC might be regarded 
as a "back up" political strategy which had not been fully exploited 
but nevertheless remained should the need to use it arise. 
The relative lack of attention which characterized both the city 
and the police administration's attitude towards the RCPC can be 
demonstrated in two ways. First, the chief had less than two months 
before his retirement from the department. The political conflict 
surrounding both his competency and the efficiency and effectiveness 
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of the police department had slowly been appeased by the variety of 
methods discussed earlier. Once the chief announced his impending 
retirement, the protesting group no longer had the resource of public 
indignation on their side. Arousing public sentiments empowered them 
when the demand for McHugh's resignation or termination was a possibi-
lity. Having chosen retirement, McHugh no longer had a vested interest 
in cultivating community opinion. Therefore when the RCPC was in its 
formative stages, the police chief took no active interest or part in 
the process. He literally stood to gain nothing from the involvement. 
The Resource Committee's inability to get formal statement of support 
from police administration when questioned by the RCPC, made this sit-
uation very apparent. 
Early in the development of the committee, several members had 
questioned the amount and kind of official support their activities 
and programs would glean from the police department. The Resource 
Committee was vague in responding to these questions, often making 
statements such as "this has yet to be determined by the new police 
chief when the selection process has been completed." The Resource 
Committee actually commented on one occasion that they had to be very 
careful in their representation of the police department because they 
did not have the authority to officially commit the police department 
nor the City of Evanston to the continuation of the crime prevention 
program beyond the period covered by the grant. Resource Committee 
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members were obviously uncomfortable when these citizen concerns were 
voiced. Their main concern at this time was not with the eminent 
future of the RCPC but with the immediate implementation of goals 
which they had written into the crime prevention grant. 
Once the uncertainty of official support from police admini-
stration became apparent to the committee, attention turned to question-
ing the official recognition and support from the city manager's 
office. The Resource Committee was questioned as to whether the city 
manager and the city council were aware of their existence, their 
activities, and whether the city would support their programs both 
officially and financially following the expiration of the federal 
grant. Again, answers were vague indicating the uncertainty under 
which the police department was operating at the time. Resource 
Committee members did not have the authority to commit either the po-
lice department nor the ~ity to the future of the RCPC. However, they 
were very much aware of the political ramifications of this uncertain-
ty. Their own political power (and indeed the security of their jobs) 
was contingent upon remaining vaguely noncommital until a new police 
chief was selected and subsequently announced his own stand on crime 
prevention and police/community relations. 
The Resource Committee was also very much aware of the RCPC's 
need for assurance that their efforts were to be takan seriously and 
that they would ultimately have some impact in the community at large. 
On several occasions Rosenbaum brought up the organizational problem 
of keeping community leaders interested and involved in a committee. 
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He stressed several times the importance of developing multiple issues 
which would help to ensure the continuation of the committee above 
and beyond the life of the crime prevention grant. 
Rosenbaum is familiar with research regarding the mobilization of 
citizens in to community activities. Since the attendance of some 
committee members had been rather sporadic, this was a concern to 
the Resource Committee. This is typically not a characteristic of 
a group which poses a threat to the city/police administration. This 
would preclude the process of cooptation from two perspectives. First, 
since there is the need to motivate community involvement, the RCPC 
does not represent an organization which the Resource Committee needs 
to coopt. Secondly, the Resource Committee's interest in alleviating 
this organizational problem is indicative of a genuine concern for the 
success of the committee which goes beyond the immediate concern 
for implementing the feasibility tests. Although operating at a 
disadvantage because of the high degree of uncertainty involved in the 
continuation and official direction of the committee, the resource 
committee itself has excercised a high degree of control over the goal 
setting of the organization and the implementation of the programs 
which it has developed. We shall discuss this control in greater 
detail in a later section. 
A third variation in the degree of importance attributed to the 
RCPC occurred in December 1981. The city manager, after twelve years 
as the chief city administrator, announced his resignation from his 
post to take the same position in Corpus cristi, Texas. This city 
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administrator now no longer had a vested interest in perpetuating and 
legitimizing the RCPC. This evaluation in no way intends to completely 
discount the possibility that either the city administration or the 
city council had a sincere interest in the community welfare being 
addressed by this committee. The intention is merely to point out 
that this issue was no longer politically volatile because the direction 
of public sentiment no longer served as a powerful resource because 
two of the principle actors in the controversy had exited the city. 
The importance of the RCPC recently took on a new dimension of 
importance. Howard L. Rogers assumed the position of Chief of Police 
on January 4, 1982. Rogers is the former assistant Chief of Police of 
Cinncinnati, Ohio. Organizationally Rogers suffers a disadvantage not 
previously encountered by McHugh. McHugh had the advantage of sharing 
an organizational history with the officers and the rank and file 
under his command. While as previously discussed this shared history 
can cause problems of "cronyism" and organization inefficiency, it 
does offer the chief a social base on which to build his administration 
and authority. Rogers as an outsider, does not have this history to 
form a social basis of support within the organization. 
Rogers has attempted to establish himself with the police depart-
ment in two ways. First~ Rogers has extensively interviewed and dis-
cussed departmental procedures and needs with top ranking personnel 
as well as the rank and file. He has reinstituted the importance 
given to rank and organizational experience as prerequisites for 
division heads and section heads. This hierarchy had become less 
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important during the year prior to McHugh's retirement. Following 
the transformation of several top ranking positions to civilian posi-
tions, there had been an accompanying increase in the chief's reliance 
on civilian "expertise". Rosenbaum, as a newly employed civilian 
with "expert knowledge', maintained considerable influence over McHugh's 
decisions. In his efforts to modernize Evanston Police Department and 
make crucial changes in organizational policy, McHugh frequently chose 
the more theoretical advise of Rosenbaum over the experiential advice 
of his sworn personnel. Such a change of policy created a visible 
rift between the majority of sworn personnel (both officers and the rank 
and file) and Rosenbaum as the implementer of departmental policy 
and programs. It appears that Rogers had very astutely analyzed this 
situation and has taken steps to decrease the power and influence of 
Rosenbaum in departmental matters by returning the division formerly 
under Rosenbaum's control back to the supervision of sworn personnel. 
Essentially, Rosenbaum has formally and to a greater degree been 
informally stripped of much of his power and influence and Rogers has 
made concrete steps forward in gaining both the respect and support of 
the department. 
Secondly, being disadvantaged by the initial lack of a social base 
in his organization, Rogers has gone beyond the police department in 
seeking support. Rogers has a history of close community involvement 
in his former role in Cincinnati. Since his appointment in January, 
Rogers has taken an active interest in the activities of the RCPC. 
The design, printing, and distribution of the crime prevention newsletter 
by the committee has had the official approval of his office. He had 
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made a point of addressing the committee itself at which time he stressed 
the need for the police department to work closely with the community 
to make the city a better place to live. Rogers has also responded 
very positively to individual committee members requests for police 
involvement in their community areas. The credibility of the RCPC has 
taken on renewed importance during the past three months. The new 
chief has both a genuine interest in productive police/community 
relations and an interest in facilitating his entry into a relatively 
closed organization and the community at large. While the exact 
outcome of this renewed interest in the RCPC remains to be determined, 
the committee itself feels its future to be less uncertain in nature. 
A general discussion of the process of cooptation has been 
presented above, as it applies to the formation of the RCPC. This 
discussion has attempted to outline the discontinous manner in which 
the cooptive process has been utilized, as political circumstances 
and realities have changed in the city as well as within the police 
organization itself. The outset of this study began with the hypothesis 
that the city government/police department viewed the formation of 
this committee as a means of appeasing public demands for the reduction 
of crime in the city and the assessment of the effectiveness and ef-
ficiency of the former police chief and the organization in general. 
As has been demonstrated above, this cooptive process vacilated in 
the intention, intensity and consequences in response to uncertain 
environmental conditions. As the control over the factors of uncer-
tainty changed, so did the use of cooptive strategies. Once the former 
chief had announced his retirement and the Police Management Study 
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was underway, the pooling of public sentiments and the threat of 
disruptive social protest in the form of presentations to the council, 
was lessened. The RCPC became a relatively neutral body in the eyes 
of city/police administration and therefore official attention was 
withdrawn from its operations. With the inception of the new police 
chief, the RCPC has become the object of renewed attention as a means 
of developing and broadening a community social base in the face of 
intraorganizational uncertainty. As previously mentioned, this 
community social base was one alternative action or resource which 
McHugh chose not to develop in the face of controversy. While the 
selection of the new chief was very much geared towards a candidate 
with a strong community background, the development of close police/ 
community relations provides Rogers with a visible sense of legitimacy 
in the eyes of the police organization as well as the city in general. 
The strategy to be chosen by the new city manager (as of yet not 
selected) towards the RCPC as a city wide organization remains to be 
seen. 
Residential Crime Prevention Committee 
Evolution of Organization 
The Residential Crime Prevention Committee developed as part of 
the Comprehensive Crime Prevention grant. As previously mentioned, 
community organizations were selected from a list of 800 community 
groups listed at the public library as being based in Evanston. The 
Urban Affairs Department at Northwestern University had been contracted 
to research the activities and concerns of both community groups and 
private citizens. These results were then submitted to the police 
department and letters were sent out to community groups on file at 
the library. Individual citizens were also notified via the Evanston 
Review that such a committee was being formed. 
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Three open meetings were held in the summer of 1981. In September 
the police department attempted to bring some closure to the formation 
of the committee by designating those attending the September 22, 1981 
meeting as the "official" crime prevention committee. According to 
members of the resource committee, this was done because the same 
people were not attending the meetings regularly and thus the organ-
izational structure and goals of the committee could not be formulated 
in an orderly manner. Thirteen community organization leaders and 
three individual residents comprised the committee in addition to a 
four member Resource Committee selected by the police department. 
Three of these four persons on the Resource Committee were members of 
the police department. Two were police officers and one was the 
Director of Planning and Research (a civilian position), The fourth 
member was a Professor of Sociology and Journalism at Northwestern 
University. Although as an employee of the police department the author 
had been aware of the general content of the grant, involvement had 
been exclusively with the planning and collection of data for a bur-
glary study as another part of the grant. 
There was no personal involvement with the conception or organ-
ization of the RCPC prior to the formation of the committee on Sept. 
22, 1981. The first four months the RCPC was in existence, the meetings 
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were chaired by Frank Kaminski, one of the officers on the Resource 
Committee. Kaminski attempted to get the committee to elect a chair-
person and secretary in the first meeting, however, the uncertainty 
surrounding the goals and objectives of the committee, made community 
leaders unwilling to make this decision immediately. Also, none of 
the committee members knew each other prior to involvement with the 
RCPC. This fact coupled with the lack of clarity surrounding their 
role in this committee made members prefer to sit back and observe the 
flow of events before committing themselves to the selection of offi-
cers. The Resource Committee outlined and distributed an agenda at the 
outset of each meeting. They were also responsible for taking minutes, 
having them typed up and distributed to members prior to the next 
meeting. 
In January, 1982, the RCPC finally elected a chairperson and a 
co-chairperson. Since that time, this chairperson has presided over 
these meetings and has been responsible for moving things forward in 
terms of working through proposed agenda items. The Resource Com-
mittee still maintains tight control over the committee structure and 
agenda items. This is partially due to the fact that the chairperson 
(and indeed the committee in general) still depends a great deal on 
the Resource Committee for guidance and direction. The uncertain 
future of the committee and the uncertainty of organizational goals 
which plagues the RCPC, makes members unwilling or unable to maintain 
a more marked independence from the Resource Committee. 
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Secondly, this dependence is partially due to the fact that the 
police chief has the sole responsibility of authorizing all documents 
or issuances of this committee. Since there has been no direct 
communication with the new police chief until the middle of March 
(1982), committee members have had to rely on the Resource Committee 
as an intermediary entity. 
Lastly, this dependence may be attributed to the Resource 
Committee's vested interest in fulfilling the objective of designing, 
distributing and measuring the effects of a community crime prevention 
newsletter. This objective has been the major motivating force behind 
the educational process initiated by the Resource Committee. Although 
overtly stressing at each meeting that the objectives of the RCPC were 
to be established by the community leaders themselves, the Resource 
Committee had been successful in "coopting" these leaders into estab-
lishing the newsletter as a top priority. A detailed discussion of 
this process is presented below in the section entitled "Establishing 
Organizational Goals". 
At the present time, the committee's role in the development of 
the newsletter is nearly at a close. The format and the tone of these 
meetings will be expected to shift somewhat now that the Resource Com-
mittee has been successful in achieving its major objective. In an in-
terview with the committee chairperson, a personal interest in the 
development of a neighborhood watch network was very prominent. There 
have already been signs that this will be the next program objective 
as the chairperson has requested that a package be presented to the 
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committee by resource personnel for consideration. It remains to 
be seen whether interaction patterns will change now that the time 
constraints and structure imposed by the Resource Committee have pro-
duced the outcome they intended. It may be that the RCPC will 
now take more initiative in developing the individual interests of 
community leaders. This situation could lead to an interesting 
process of negotiation on the future goals and objectives of the 
committee. It also holds the possibility of cooptation by the more 
powerful members of the committee. The distribution of power among 
committee members will be discussed in the section on interaction 
patterns. Discussion will now turn to a descriptive analysis of in-
dividual community leaders and the organizations/area they represent. 
Figure 2 represents a map of the municipality in question de-
picting the community areas respresented by the RCPC. As Figure 2 
indicates, many areas of Evanston are not represented on the committee. 
As explained in an earlier section, this committee was formed by a 
process of self selection. While those groups represented on the com-
mittee do not represent the only community groups concerned with the 
issue of crime and fear of crime, there do appear to be similarities 
in the type of areas which most of these groups represent. While 
many areas in Evanston contain a characteristic mix of housing stock 
(single family homes versus apartments), income levels and race, the 
majority of community areas represented on the RCPC, are white middle 
class areas. The community leaders themselves are characteristically 
between the ages of 25 and 40. Many are young professionals with a 
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vested interest in improving or maintaining the current quality of 
lif~:. in the neighborhood as an acceptable 11 family" atmosphere. This 
is consistent with previous research on citizen involvement in com-
munity organizations and issues within the community as a whole 
(Lavrakus, 1981). 
Ten of the community leaders are male, three are female. Two 
individual residents are female and one is male. While the majority 
of committee members are clearly male, the female members have been 
very prominent in the proceedings of this committee. This will be 
discussed further in the following section. Many of the committee 
members represent relatively small geographical areas. This 
is not surprising once community leaders' emphases and interest in the 
mobilization of neighbors is understood. The members of the RCPC are 
very much concerned with eradicating the anonymity in their own neigh-
borhoods. They view their involvement in the RCPC and the development 
of neighborhood crime prevention programs as one method of accomplish-
ing this goal. Several leaders have successfully combined the develop~ 
ment of the crime prevention newsletter with other neighborhood con-
cerns (traffic and street lighting, as well as the exchange of inform-
al informa.tion such as recipes and tips) and attracted a variety of 
people to their neighborhood meetings. This development is another 
reason why committee members have not been included to protest the 
structure and objectives imposed by the Resource Committee--the out-
come of the newsletter has not been entirely to their disadvantage. 
Discussion will now proceed to the patterns of interaction which have 
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developed between individual committee members, between members of the 
larger committee and the Resource Committee and between various sub-
groups within the committee itself. 
Patterns of Interaction 
In the initial meetings of the RCPC there were no defined pat-
terns of interaction other than random discussions between committee 
members and the Resource Committee. The basic reason for this was the 
fact that none of the committee members oreviouslv knew each other nor 
had anv of their organizations worked together ori previous projects. 
With the exception of one committee member, none of the committee 
memberos had previously worked with the police department or members of 
the Resource Committee. As previously discussed, this situation was a 
major reason for the committee's initial reluctance to elect a chair-
person or secretary and their heavy reliance on the Resource Committee 
for direction. 
As the Resource Committee continued the education process on 
crime prevention strategies and committee members began to formulate 
their own interests in crime prevention, more specific patterns of 
interaction began to emerge. Area interests and problems specific 
to certain organizations began to appear. During the initial stages 
of development committee members participated on a somewhat equal ba-
sis. However, as specific interests began to surface, two changes in 
their patterns of interaction were observed. 
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First, committee members representing community organizations 
began to be more vocal and more influential in discussions and decision 
making. The Resource Committee itself, while recognizing the individ-
ual resident's right to be a part of the RCPC, did not have as great 
an interest in either the ideas or opinions of these individuals. The 
general aim of the RCPC was community involvement, and while these 
individual residents were part of the larger Evanston community, they 
did not have one basic resource to offer the Resource Committee or 
the committee at large--a social base or membership contituency. The 
Resource Committee was in need of a community network for the distri-
bution and testing of the crime prevention newsletter. Since this was 
their main initial objective, these individual residents were not in 
a position to offer a valuable resource to the police representatives. 
Within the functioning of the RCPC itself, these individual 
members gradually participated less and less in discussion or in the 
generating of ideas. Other members, as representatives of groups, 
could voice the concerns or even demands of their contituencies more 
readily because they had the implication of "numbers" behind them. 
These individual members themselves appeared to view themselves as 
less and less able to add anything of value to the proceedings. The 
general disengagement of these individuals was the result of two 
processes. First, they were constantly reminded that they were "dif-
ferent" from the rest of the committee members by inevitable references 
to the geographical areas represented by other members. Issues such 
as the distribution of the newsletters by community group members and 
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the many discussions on how to mobilize community members to active-
ly participate in community affairs and how to maintain a high level 
of participation futther reinforced this separation. Other committee 
members reinforced this exclusion by dismissing the comments made by 
these individual members as unimportant in such ways as not commenting 
or reacting to their contributions, or stating outright that individ-
ual committee members' topics were not the immediate concern of the 
committee as a whole. 
As a result, one individual resident has withdrawn completely 
from participation in the committee and two others have reverted to 
intermittent attendance in the last two months. Two of these three 
are female and it might be ;peculated that sex is probably an inter-
vening variable in this process. The remaining individual resident 
participant is a black male who comes from a lower income area of 
Evanston. On the occasions when this man has interjected comments 
or concerns, he has had difficulty articulating his ideas in an 
understandable way. This appears to be due to a level of education 
somewhat lower than the general education levels of the RCPC as a 
whole. 
Based on the above discussion, it can be concluded that the in-
fluence of these individual residents in the activities of the RCPC 
have decreased as the influence of other members has increased. This 
general decline appears to be the result of a general lack of resources 
which these individual residents are able to offer the committee. This 
deficiency in resources is due in part to the lack of a social base 
behind these members and also to the social characteristics these 
members bring with them. 
The second change which has occurred in terms of interaction 
patterns has been the emergence of a selected core of individuals 
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who are more powerful in committee policy making. There are four 
members who comprise this influential core. Richard Clark was elect-
ed by an unanimous vote as chairperson of the RCPC. Clark represents 
the community designated as Area 1 on Figure 2. Clark is approximate-
ly thirty-five years of age and holds a college degree and a prof-
essional job. He and his wife are relatively new homeowners in this 
area. Clark's basic responsibility is presiding over the actual 
meetings and seeing to it that discussions are limited to the issues 
on the agenda and in organizing new agenda items for future meetings. 
Prior to his election, Clark had voiced dissatisfaction (in a personal 
interview) with the direction the committee had taken in the initial 
stages of development. His personal view was that the committee had 
been influenced by the "hidden agenda" of Rosenbaum which had result-
ed in the selection of the newsletter as the committee's first priority. 
Clark's own interest lies with the development of a neighborhood 
crime watch program. This interest has since come to the forefront 
now that the basic project of the newsletter has been accomplished. 
Clark was not part of the newsletter subcommittee. 
Camille Lee is a sim:le fe!male between the aszes of 25 and 30. 
She represents the Elks Park Neiehborhood Association which is des-
ignated as Area 3 in Figure 2. Lee resides in an apartment complex 
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(typical of most of the area she represents) with her seriously ill 
mother. Lee holds a degree in elementarv education with aspirations 
of studying landscaping and environmental desi2n at Harvard University. 
She is currently unemPloved and has been unable to find a iob for 
aoProximatelv one vear. Lee is the most powerful person on the RCPC. 
Although Lee is not an elected member of the RCPC. she has been 
a ma;or force behind the writing of the newsletter itself and in get-
ting it printed at a reasonable cost bv a friend who is a printer. She 
has been the prime motivating force behind the design and authorship 
of the newsletter. She has also developed a strong working relation-
ship with Deputy Chief Logan, who is the division head of the Communitv 
Relations division of the police department. Logan is the person 
responsible for the administration of CCCPP but does not attend the 
RCPC meetings. Therefore Lee has had to go beyond the power structure 
of the RCPC and the Resource Committee in establishing this relation-
ship. 
Jean Nerenberg is a middle aged career woman from an affluent 
section of the city. Nereberg's youngest child is in junior high 
school. She represents Northwestern Neighbors, which is a relatively 
flexible and fluid organization at this time. This organization evolv-
ed from a series of block parties where Nerenberg took the initiative 
to introduce the "whistle stoo" orogram followng the raoes of several 
voung women in the area. This areas is designated as Area 4 in Fig-
ure 2. 
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Nerenberg also exerts an influence on activities of the commit-
tee. She was the only person who made a formal statement to the 
committee that she was not in favor of the newsletter as the top 
priority of the RCPC. She made it clear that she felt that its pur-
suit had been the decision of the Resource Committee and not the RCPC 
as a whole. It is significant that when the RCPC subcommittee charged 
with the responsibility of designing and writing the newsletter was 
formed, she was suggested by the Resource Committee as a member, elect-
ed by the RCPC in general and accepted the assignment. 
Jim Freund is the fourth member in this core of influential mem-
bers. Freund is a young single professional person which has recent-
ly moved to the Evanston area. He is the representative from the 
Marywood Neighbors Association--the key community group behind the 
original police controversy. The geographical area which he rep-
resents is labelled Area 5 on Figure 2. Freund speaks less frequent-
ly at RCPC meetings than do any of the other "core membeTs but has an 
i~pact on committee decisions. He also was assigned the job of pro-
ducing the newsletter. 
Marilyn Osterkamp represents the Northwestern Neighbors as does 
Jean Nerenberg. Osterkamp was initially incorporated into the RCPC 
as an alternative for this organization when Nerenberg was unable to 
attend meetings. While she does not attend RCPC meetings on a reg-
ular basis, she was one of the four members of the subcommittee 
charged with the responsibility of producing the community newsletter. 
Osterkamp works full time in a Chicago business. Her husband teaches 
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at Evanston High School. She has three children, the oldest of which 
is a senior in high school. 
Osterkamp is more caustic in voicing her reservations concerning 
the leadership and manipulation by the Resource Committee. She would 
be a more influential member in the RCPC if her attendance was not so 
intermittent and her other committments spread over such a broad area. 
The next several months should prove to be a time of change for 
the RCPC. The intellectual interests of the Resource Committee have, 
for all practical purposes been accomplished. Individual community 
interests should begin to become more apparent and the formation 
of new political factions and influence within the RCPC will no 
doubt occur. 
Establishing Organizational Goals 
During the first meeting of the RCPC, Rosenbaum introduced the 
experimental approach to the crime prevention program. He outlined 
several basic issues which he felt "would have to be considered by the 
group". "We have an approach to suggest" but as we go along we are 
still faced with the question of whether it (the program to be develop-
ed) will work in Evanston. For his experimental approach he indicated 
the group would take previous local research coupled with available 
national research on crime prevention techniques and decide what 
approaches were appropriate for Evanston. He stated that they would 
take this research and combine it with the experience of the committee 
members to decide what crimes were of major concern to Evanstonians. 
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He further stated that they would have to determine what neighborhoods 
required soecial attention. The final steo would be to test whether 
the program they had developed actually work. 
The first two months of RCPC meetings consisted basicallv of 
educational sessions. Lavrakus (the Professor from Northwestern) 
presented data from the community group study to the group to emphasize 
what things were issues to Evanston residents. Throughout these 
first months various members kept asking questions about formal sup-
port from the city and police department and whether this committee 
would have any "clout" in producing needed changes. One of the main 
thrusts of this concern centered on member's unwillingness to expend 
time and energy on projects which would not have the official support 
of the city nor result in any positive programmatic changes. 
During these meetings Rosenbaum talked frequently of "the need 
to test these things out." Recommendations had been drawn up by 
Lavrakus and Rosenbaum which were based on the Northwestern study. 
Members were asked at the second meeting to prioritize these recom-
mendations. Several recommendations pertaining to the activities of 
a crime prevention unit at the police department were given high 
priority but the actual recommendation stating that the crime preven-
tion unit at Evanston Police Department should be expanded was rated 
4 
as a low priority. 
4 
One member actually pointed this out at a later meeting. This sit-
uation indicated that the Resource Committee was asking them to vote 
on recommendations which they did not understand at that time. 
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Various members continued to voice their particular interests 
and goals in terms of committee activities. One community group was 
particularly interested in reducing the fear of crime (represented by 
a female member). Several members were very interested in activities 
which neighbors would be involved in (developing a block watch was of 
particular interest). 
The Resource Committee allowed these first few meetings to be 
relatively fluid in nature. While they did have a pre-arranged agenda, 
there were no strenuous efforts to structure discussion to particular 
issues. This situation did no·.: occur uutil the third meeting. Both 
Kaminski and Rosenbaum began to subtly guide the discussions to partic-
ular issues on the agenda. When members would bring up a topic or go 
off on a tangent not pertinent to the immediate topic at hand, one of 
the Resource Committee members would interject after the member 
finished speaking to prevent responses from other members on what had 
just been said. 
At the outset, RCPC members were very concerned about the object-
ives/goals of the committee and the particular role which they were 
expected to play. Questions such as "what is the objective of this 
committee" and "what is the role of the police vis a vis the citizen-
ry?" were expresed by all members. The RCPC is composed of an ed-
ucated citizenry ~vhich is very much concerned with their neighborhoods. 
They have consistently shown themselves to be a group requiring speci-
fic goals be outlined as a part of their involvement. While the ma-
jority of them did not have solidly formulated objectives when the 
committee was initiated, they have made it clear that they needed 
concrete projects and objectives to ensure their continued involve-
ment in the RCPC. 
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In contrast to community leaders, the Resource Committee had very 
specific goals in mind when this committee was formed. As previously 
mentioned, the RCPC was written into the crime prevention grant two 
years earlier. Also written into the grant was an "experiment" de-
signed to evaluate the effectiveness of programs to be designed by 
the RCPC. There are three ways in which a crime prevention program 
can be evaluated. These measures consist of 1) measurement of com-
pliance and/or participation of citizens 2) measure of whether people 
feel safer or not and 3) whether crime is numerically reduced or not. 
Since the EPD received funding for only one and one half years of the 
originally projected three year grant and the RCPC was not scheduled 
to begin until the second year, a numerical measurement of crime was 
not a feasible short term assessment of the impact of the crime 
prevention programs developed by the RCPC. To measure participation 
and feelings of safety would require the rapid development and imple-
mentation of a crime prevention program which could be evaluated be-
fore the grant expired in June of 1982. The design of such a research 
project in such a short period of time was virtually impossible. 
Designing a community crime prevention news·letter appeared to 
be a solution to the time constraints. The newsletter would be a 
concrete program which could be designed and distributed in a relative-
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ly short period of time. Distribution could be made via RCPC com-
munity leaders according to a pattern determined by the Resource 
Committee. The Resource Committee determined that 3,000 newsletter 
would be distributed each month for three months, with 1,500 of these 
containing actual crime information. These same households would 
receive this letter each month. At the end of the three month period, 
a random digit dialing survey would be conducted to determine whether 
citizens receiving the specific crime information had altered their 
protective behaviors or changed in their attitudes towards crime in 
Evanston. 
As previously mentioned, the first three meetings of the RCPC 
were relatively fluid in terms of set;ing objectives and policy. How-
ever, in the fourth meeting, the Resource Committee coopted the RCPC 
members into making the development and distribution of the newsletter 
the first priority of the committee. This was not a "sudden" show of 
force by the Resource Committee but was a gradual process which cul-
minated at this particular meeting. 
Rosenbaum had vaguely outlined the experimental method to be 
employed in the "feasibility" test. However, no mention was made of 
this feasibility test in conjunction with a particular crime preven-
tion program. In the second meeting the choice of producing the news-
letter was introduced by the Resource Committee. Many RCPC members 
regarded the Resource Committee's initial role as one of educating the 
community leaders. This was a necessary part of the proceedings 
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because the majority of the committee members involved had no previous 
experience in crime prevention nor were they even aware of previous 
programs existent in other cities. The Resource Committee distribut-
ed a summary of crime prevention strategies published by the Illinois 
Law Enforcment Commission. 
Lavrakus summarized information which had been collected on which 
particular issues were of concern to the majority of Evanstonians 
and assured committee members that crime was a major concern of most 
people. Lavrakus provided this information broken down by area of the 
city. He compared people's perceptions of the severity of crime in 
their area with the actual incidents of crime to demonstrate the im-
portance of educating the citizenry. Kaminski presented findings from 
a study of EPD personnel concerning attitudes towards crime prevention 
in conjunction with a participative citizenry. 
The contention here is not that this dissemination of information 
was unimportant but rather this was a necessary step for the committee 
as a whole to begin to participate in the development of any crime 
prevention program. However, the skillful way in which this educa-
tion process was carried out and the selection of the newsletter as a 
top priority at the fourth meeting, were results of a pre-conceived 
set of objectives on the part of the Resource Committee. The news-
letter project was introduced as a motion by the Resource Committee 
and carried through by a majority vote. Several members had made 
comments that they believed that a newsletter was not a bad idea but 
a concrete, expanded prevention program was needed to involve people 
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in the neighborhoods. This was a major concern of most members--
they were seeking ways to mobilize and involve citizens in their areas 
in a neighborhood effort. The week following the passing of this 
motion, the meeting minutes stated that the motion had been carried 
through unanimously. One female member objected to this statement, 
expressing that she was not in support of the newsletter as the first 
priority of the committee and wanted to be recorded as such. Rosen-
baum responded to her objection with the statement that since she had 
failed to attend the previous meeting and had failed to send an 
alternative, the vote had been based only on those present. 
Indepth interviews with committee members indicated in all but 
one case, that the development of the newsletter had not been their 
main objective. The majority of committee members were interested in 
developing a block/neighborhood watch program which would involve 
their organizational membership--not in generating "more paper which 
won't even be read". Committee members were confused as to how they 
"had become committed to the nemsletter". It was unanimously felt 
that the police department had "ulterior motives" involved in the 
selection of the newsletter as a major project. Committee members 
were more willing to attribute these motives to a particular member of 
the Resource Committee rather than to the committee as a whole. This 
member was Rosenbaum. Rosenbaum was believed to be operating from a 
"hidden agenda" in his involvement in the RCPC. All but one RCPC 
member interviewed voiced a distrust of Rosenbaum's motives and felt 
that they were manipulating the committee. However, each member felt 
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that they were gleaning sufficient rewards from their participation 
to warrant their cooperation in carrying out the newsletter project 
and felt that once this project was out of the way, they could begin 
to work on projects more pertinent to the interests of their community 
areas. At this point it must be concluded that a second level of 
cooptation has taken place. 
The RCPC was initiated with statements that decisions on goals, 
objectives and the role of citizens in these programs was entirely 
at their discretion. The first few meetings were conducted with"an 
aura of "fluidity" with a subtle thread of educational bias inter-
woven. Had committee members been more educated in terms of crime 
prevention strategies, tactics and programs, it is doubtful that the 
Resource Committee would have been so successful in initiating the 
newsletter as the first objective. The introduction of this motion a 
a later point in time would have found itself up against a less 
naive and a more educated committee and would probably have had a 
more difficult time being passed. 
Secondly, time was a crucial factor for the resource committee 
in terms of producing a measurable program in an extremely short 
period of time (seven months). As Rosenbaum stated at the first meet-
ing, "the Evanston Police Department has an interest in moving things 
along. If we don't move along, we will be in touch with the chair-
person to discuss it" (the chairperson to be elected by the committee 
itself). 
CHAPTER V 
MOTIVATIONAL INFLUENCES 
In the previous chapter the use of the Residential Crime Preven-
tion Committee as a cooptive strategy of the city government was dis-
cussed. Results indicate that the RCPC was not conceived as a cooptive 
strategy but did take on varying degrees of importance as the police 
controversy gained intensity and ebbed with the retirement of the form-
er police chief and the resignation of the city manager. It has been 
hypothesized that the new police chief will maintain an active interest 
in the future of the RCPC as a means of establishing a solid social 
base within the community. 
The RCPC itself has also been discussed in detail. It has been 
demonstrated that the evolution of the RCPC was the result of a self 
selection process among Evanston community groups. This self selection 
process indicated that the police department/city government did not 
utilize a direct method of "absorbing" the protesting community group 
(Marywood) but rather used an indirect method of absorbing an "con-
flict" on the issue of crime within the Evanston community as a whole. 
In essence the police department did not reduce the dissension from 
Marywood but prevented an informal network from developing which 
could enlist the support of large portions of the Evanston population. 
Modern social movement theories, most notably the Resource 
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Mob~lization per~pective~ have emphasized the organizational problem of 
maintaining a high level of participation of members throughout the 
life of the movement itself. In light of the previous discussion con~ 
cerning the strong "influence" of the Resource Committee on the setting 
of RCPC goals, it seems appropriate at this time to discuss the vari-
ous factors which motivated individual members to continue participa-
tion even when they were in opposition to the newsletter as a major 
goal. In order to adequately understand this process, three specific 
periods of social unrest in the history of the United States will be 
briefly discussed. These are the Progressive Era of the early 1900's, 
the welfare movement of the 1930's and 1940's, and the social movements 
of the 1960's. Broadly speaking, the Progressive Era characterized 
a period of middle class reform which did not aim to change the basic 
institutions of the democratic society. This movement encompassed a 
number of basic goals. Among these goals were such issues as: the 
Americanization of non-WASP immigrants, an improved quality of life 
for the working class, improved consumer goods and public services. 
the end of corruption and corporate rapaciousness, and the streamlining 
and professionalization of the government. 
A second broad based era in the history of U.S. social protest 
is characterized by the welfare rights and industrial workers movements 
of the 1930's and 1940's. Piven and Cloward (1977) provide a detailed 
discussion of the goals of these movements. It is the contention of 
these authors that the movements themselves were relatively ineffective 
in realizing major movement goals because of inherent inequalities. 
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A third period of pervasive social protest can be identi~!ed 
as the social movements o~ the 1960's, Li,ke the movements ot the 
1930's and 1940's, these movements were concerned with affecting major 
structural changes in American society, The 1970's and 1980's have 
seen the relative failure of the American Left in the movements of 
the 60's being transformed into more workable goals of social change 
which are aimed at the conmrunity level, These community movements 
are viewed by the left as a first step to developing national networks 
geared towards changing major social institutions. 
Crime is just one among many social issues which has surfaced 
with this pervasive concern over community life. It is an issue 
which is capable of illiciting strong emotional reactions from citizens 
through a type of snowballing effect. The magnitude of social protest 
which this snowball effect is capable of illiciting from a community 
is considerable. The response of the Evanston police/city administra-
tion can thus be viewed as a "anticipatory" response aimed at allevi-
ating such a movement before it can gain momentum. This the context 
from which the RCPC must be viewed. Discussion will next center 
around the placement of individual RCPC members and their motivations 
for continued participation in the RCPC. The remainder of this chapt-
er will thus seek to place the police controversy and the RCPC within 
this social climate and attempt to explain the continued participation 
of RCPC members in the fact of conflicting RCPC and Resource Committee 
goals. 
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Citizen Participation: Motivating Factors 
In contrast to the macro-structural issues of social movements 
in the 1960's, the 1970's and the 1980's have produced an abundance 
of grassroot associations aimed at issues at the micro-level. In an 
article on the American Left, Richard Flacks summarizes the distinct-
ion between the social movements of the 60's as opposed to the move-
ments of the 70's and 80's by distinguishing two types of action--
action geared towards making history and action geared towards making 
life. The movements of the 60's were concerned with affecting the 
shape of society by directing social change at the most basic level 
of our democratice insitutions. However, for the majority of people, 
this type of action is too abstract and removed from their real every-
day lives. 
The urban social movements which characterize the 70's and 80's 
represent a shift of focus from basic democratic principles at the 
national level to the actual application of participatory democracy 
at the local level. It is not surprising that the cities are becoming 
the focus of such movements, especially the older U.S. cities, because 
these cities represent the most concentrated examples of the political, 
economical and social problems facing the people of this country. 
The changing urban milieu for the people who have either chosen 
or are forced by necessity to remain in the cities has mobilized many 
citizens into action to prevent any more drastic changes from affect-
ing the quality of their lives. These issues range from such things 
as redlining to rent control, real estate speculation, stabilizing 
changing neighborhoods, as well as crime prevention and reduction. 
Various factors have been cited as precluding increased citizen 
involvement in political affairs. Among these are: 
• The hard economic reality facing the majority of American 
citizens today (a reality, until recently, whose greatest 
impact was felt exclusively by the lower classes). 
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• The increasing domination of "big business" in all aspects of 
social and political life. 
• The increq.se in social problems such as crime, poverty, and 
social services due to a declining tax base and rising pro-
portion of the needy. 
The factors above represent only a partial list of structural 
factors which contribute to the increase in citizen's involvement in 
political and ommunity affairs. Through the grassroots movements 
people actually began to defend their established ways of life. People 
have a vested interest in maintaining their community or neighorhood 
because their culture is rooted there. Many people are seeking to 
recapture some control over thier lives by rebuilding a sense of 
community and some democratic control over their lives. It is from 
this perspective that the general level of citizen involvement in crime 
prevention shall be analyzed. 
The above shift in political focus has occurred in the area of 
crime. While crime has been a focus of concern since the 1960's, the 
mode in which this concern has been expressed hds changed. In the 
1960's concern about crime was expressed on the national level. The 
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Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) was created during 
this period. This federal agency was endowed with large sums of 
money which it contracted out to independent research teams across the 
country. The many research projects funded by the LEAA were designed 
to provide a better understanding of crime as a national problem and 
recommendations for reducing the crime rate in general. LEAA was also 
prominent in funding police departments in their efforts to improve 
such areas as information retrieval systems, communications and crisis 
intervention. While the broad based political interests of the 60's 
did not preclude the existence of community politics, these interests 
did tend to be submerged by such concerns as the Free Speech Movement, 
the Anti-War Movement and the Civil Rights Movement. 
As the 1970's and 1980's saw a shift of interest from the macro-
issues to micro-issues, a comparable shift in concern over crime 
occurred. In 1973 LEAA first made funding available to individual 
communities or community groups in the area of crime prevention. Since 
that time a wide array of crime prevention programs and strategies 
have been implemented across the country. 
In placing Evanston within this context, it is importanct to 
understand the general political atmosphere of Evanston itself. Evan-
ston has a tradition of active citizen involvement in political affairs, 
whether it be in local issues or national interests such as those 
advocated by the Peace and Freedom Party. This tradition is one 
factor which makes the city administration very sensitive and 
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aware of community opinion. This traditionally active citizenry 
coupled with the general shift from national to community issues is 
partially responsible for the emergence of crime as community issue 
in Evanston in 1980. Another contributing factor to this emergence 
is the dramatic increase in burglary and theft which occurred in 
Evanston in 1979. 
The initial development of Marywood Neighbors Association can 
be seen as an attempt at '-'participatory democracy". Two issues are 
of importance here. First, the city administration, most notably 
the city manager, had long been criticized for exerting too much 
control and influence over the city council in developing city 
policy. There were factions within the Evanston community who 
believed him to be very effective and efficient when it came to 
controlling financial functions of the city administration. However, 
it was felt that when citizen concerns pertaining to issues which 
affected the ~uality of their community and neighborhood lives were 
voiced, they fell on deaf ears. 
Marywood formed around the interests of neighborhood people 
attempting to regain a "quality of life" within the neighborhood 
which felt had been lost. The perceived increase in crime (particular-
ly burglary) must be seen as a reaction of people who felt they no 
longer had this control. Crime was no longer an "unreal" phenomena 
which happened to other people or which they heard about on the news. 
It had become a reality because it was happening to many of them 
and their neighbors. Their homes were no longer immune to being 
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burglarized. Burglary had in fact become a very real possibility in 
certain areas of the city. Some residents had found themselves burg-
larized repeatedly. 
The issue of crime happened to become the focus of these re-
generative efforts largely because of these circumstances. There had 
been this dramatic increase in the number of burglaries in Evanston 
(not just the perceptions of citizens). Citizens coming into contact 
with other citizens and sharing their own experiences served to 
mobilize an already growing community concern for the neighborhood. 
Participation in voluntary organizations such as community 
groups can also be analyzed on the level of individual participant's 
motivation. Wilson (1975) has provided a typology for investigating 
citizen incentives for participation. He distinguishes between material, 
solidary (expressive) and purposive (instrumental) incentives. Material 
incentives are clearly not pertinent to the particular issue at hand 
because they refer to tangible rewards such as money or goods. However, 
expressive and instrumental incentives, as well as a combination of 
the two, provide a good framework for analyzing the personal motivation 
of RCPC committee members in being involved in the development of the 
crime prevention program. 
First glance may indicate that there should be no concern with 
personal motivations for participation since we a=e dealing with a 
social group and a social process. However, research has shown thac 
these personal motivating factors must be taken into consideration 
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attempting to account for the emergence of a "social movement" on what-
ever scale and the continued participation of citizens in the social 
movement, committee or whatever the social entity. In other words, 
what is of concern here, is what social exchanges RCPC members are 
getting out of their continued involvement in the crime prevention 
program, even when they are aware of the cooptive nature of committee 
goals up to the present point in time. This study will attempt to 
account for this continued involvement by an anlysis of individ-
ual committee members' goals and personal motivations for involvement. 
Two methods were employed to identify motivating factors behind 
RCPC members' participation in the committee. The interview method 
provided the most useful data concerning individual members, their 
organization and the relationships of these groups to the larger com-
. 
munity. A questionnaire was also utilized in this endeavor, however, 
it did not prove to be as useful as the interview method. The thirteen 
questionnaires were mailed out with only five of the questionnaires re-
turned. Of those five questionnaires returned, certain difficulties 
with both the content and format of questions became apparent. Several 
community groups constituted ad hoc assemblies which were attempting 
to organize and mobilize community residents. They therefore did not 
possess a "social history" from which to draw answers on problem 
resolution tactics. The activities of other groups were geared more 
towards the social interactions of community residents than the 
solutions to particular community problems. In this sense, the quest-
ionnaire was very useful in identifying motivation and organizational 
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differences between community group leaders and their organizations. 
Some of these differences did not become apparent in the interviews. 
Clark, the elected chairperson of the RCPC, stated in an inter-
view. that his interest in crime and crime prevention was spurred by 
a two-fold concern. First, there was the perception of an increased 
danger to the personal welfare of his wife in his absence. He was 
no longer comfortable with her coming and going after dark or in 
particular areas of Evanston when he was not with her. Secondly, he 
and his wife had recently invested in the purchase of a home and had 
begun to view the neighborhood where this home was located as the 
neighborhood where they would raise their future family. This observa-
tion is congruent with other research (Lavrakus, 1980) which indicates 
that people who are homeowners, married, and have children are more 
likely to be involved in activities geared towards the preservation 
or improvement of community life. Clark has been very outspoken in 
his own interest in developing neighborhood crime watch programs. 
These programs are based on a shared sense of responsibility and con-
cern among members of the same geographical area (usually a block). 
They typically serve a two fold purpose of developing a network of 
people watching out for each other and protecting each other's prop-
erty, and in removing the anonymity common among residents in urban 
areas today. 
Lee is probably the most up front about both her communal and 
personal reasons for involvement in the RCPC. She too, is very inter-
ested in developing shared interest and values among community resi-
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dents. She uses the meetings where she reports the activities and 
progress of the RCPC to her organizational members as an opportunity 
to develop other organizational issues. She is very much concerned 
with mobilizing her constituency and in keeping them actively involve-
ed in the neighborhood. She is a single, career person committed to 
alleviating the anonymity of urban life which she feels is aggravated 
by the fact that a larger portion of the housing stock in her area is 
apartment dwellings. 
In an interview, Lee has stated that she does not object to the 
"manipulative" tactics employed by the Resource Committee in producing 
the newsletter, because it has facilitated some of her own goals in 
the community. She also stated that it would be dishonest not to admit 
that she achieves a certain level of personal satisfaction from being 
involved in a city-wide project (keeping in mind she was a key figure 
in the designing, writing and printing of the newsletter itself), and 
in being able to educate fellow community residents. 
Nerenberg came to the RCPC as a resident who had become in-
creasingly alarmed with the vulnerability of being female in an 
urban community and in the perceived threat to the personal safety 
of females. From the start she was against the development of a 
community crime prevention newsletter as it only served to generate 
more paper" in a world already plagued with an abundance of written 
material. Nerenberg maintained that the community was in need of 
concrete, direct action crime prevention programs such as whistle 
stop and block watches. In contrast to the majority of RCPC members 
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her main concern was with personal protection from violent crimes 
rather than home protective behaviors. Despite her integral involve-
ment in the RCPC subcommittee charged with the production of the 
newsletter, Nerenberg has stated that she will terminate her involve-
ment in the RCPC if it does not now move on to the development of 
concrete crime prevention strategies. Her identity as a female forms 
a distinct basis for her involvement in the RCPC and her interest 
in crime prevention in general. Research has shown that females are 
typically more concerned about the possibility of violent crime and 
score higher in measurements of fear of crime (Baumer, 1979; Baumer 
and Rosenbaum, 1980). 
Ivan Lippiz is the only organizational leader who does not 
represent a specific geographical area. Lippitz is the representative 
from a four member committee titled the Evanston Youth Commission. 
This is an officially sponsored arm of the Human Relations Commission. 
The commission is concerned with all aspects of the community relat-
ing to youth, be it gangs or safety in the schools. Lippitz has been 
a less influential member in the RCPC than has the three previously 
described members. He has continually attempted to get the "role of 
youth in crime prevention" as an agenda item for discussion for the 
last six months. He claims that he has continually been embarrassed 
when the youth commission has inquired as to what they can do to 
contribute to the activities and program objectives of the RCPC, 
because he has no answer for them. 
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Lippitz became involved in several community organizations 
geared towards youth problems during the past two years. This he 
attributed to the death of his sixteen year old son in a pedestrian 
crosswalk in front of Evanston High School. Lippitz is a licensed 
clinical psychologist and claims that community involvement and 
specifically involvement in the activities pertaining to the youth 
of Evanston, have been very therapeutic for him. He attributes his 
involvement in RCPC as having both an intellectual and emotional 
interest. 
The above situational discussions have been presented as ex-
amples of both the community and personal factors motivating RCPC 
members' involvement in crime prevention. More examples could easily 
be cited. However, the purpose here is not to give a personal account 
of each RCPC member, but to illustrate the broad spectrum of factors 
involved in the participation of these citizens in the RCPC and some 
of the issues involved in their continued participation. 
The second purpose for including this section on motivational 
factors is to show why a group of residents continue to participate 
in a committee which they felt has been manipulated and guided by 
forces other than themselves from the start. Despite the fact that 
most RCPC members were against the pursuit of the newsletter as a 
major goal, the satisfaction of several community and personal goals 
has occurred at the same time. Another factor accounting for con-
tinued involvement has been the anticipation that since the Resource 
Committee's major goal has now been achieved, the RCPC can now move 
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along to a pursuit of goals which are of more particular interest to 
themselves and their organizations. 
Resource Committee 
As previously stated, the Resource Committee consists of a 
four member team possessing various levels of expertise considered 
salient to the objectives of the RCPC as a part of the CCCPP. A brief 
discussion of each member will follow. 
Hank White has been the Crime Prevention Officer for EPD 
for approximately ten years. He has consituted what might be called 
the crime prevention unit of the department single handedly, prior to 
the police department being awarded the CCCPP grant. White represents 
the person at EPD which has the most knowledge and experience con-
cerning both crime prevention strategies and crime victims in Evanston. 
He has attended several intense training sessions sponsored by both 
federal and state law enforcement agencies on the issue of crime pre-
vention. 
From the outset, White has played a low profile in the RCPC 
meetings. He has been most helpful when asked specific questions by 
RCPC members but exhibits no overt inclination to influence either 
the proceedings or objectives of this committee. 
In the early meetings, White served as the committee secretary 
taking mintues and supervising their typing and distribution to members. 
He presented a fifteen-minute program on the Home Security Checks. 
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These surveys are a service EPD provides to victims of burglary and 
to other residents who request them. White has been the only person 
from EPD conducting these surveys and he gives this as the reason 
the service has not been advertised more in the media. He also 
showed two crime prevention movies which he used when lecturing to 
community organizations requesting his services. White's role in the 
RCPC is basically just a continuation of his professional role at 
EPD. He has not captialized on the RCPC as an opportunity to gain 
community support for an expanded crime prevention unit which is 
badly needed. He also has not advocated any specific crime prevention 
strategies in the course of the meetings. Members of the RCPC have 
indicated in interviews that they hold him in the highest regard 
and do not feel that he is part of the "cooptive" process operating 
in the RCPC. This can be attributed to the fact that White has not 
exploited or attempted to influence RCPC policy in any way that would 
benefit him. In fact recently White was named Crime Prevention Of-
ficer of the Year by a regional law enforcement board, but did not 
even mention this to the RCPC. White's supervisor made a casual 
reference to this during an RCPC meeting. 
Frank Kaminski is a police officer at EPD who has been assign-
ed a desk job in the Training Section and subsequently was assigned 
an academic role in the CCCPP. Kaminski holds a Masters Degree in 
Public Administration and has conducted and authored a number of 
departmental studies in his seven years as a police officer. He was 
formerly assigned to the Youth Section. 
112 
Kaminski's role has basically been the role of coordinator in 
the RCPC meetings. As previously stated. he chaired the RCPC meetings 
for the first four months. He still is responsible for seeing that 
the minutes are typed and distributed to all members. He is also 
responsible for working with the elected chairperson in coordinating 
agenda items for future meetings (although there exists other sources 
of input) and in contacting RCPC members who fail to attend meetings. 
The financial resources of the CCCPP also fall under this jurisdiction 
(although formal approval must be obtained from the chief). Kaminski's 
basic function in the RCPC has been to see that the discussions and 
decision making sessions "flow" according to plan. 
Lavrakus, holds a joint appointment in the Journalism and Urban 
Affairs Departments at Northwestern University. He has also been an 
Evanston resident for eleven years. At the first meeting he cited 
this along with the fact that he has a wife and son, and therefore 
has a vested interest in his own community. Lavrakus also has had 
considerable research experience in crime and crime related issues 
such as fear of crime, victimization, and citizen participation in 
crime prevention programs. Lavrakus therefore has both an intellectual 
and personal interest in the RCPC. As described in a previous section, 
he headed another research project included in the CCCPP grant. The 
aim of this project was to ascertain the concerns of residents and 
community organizations in both their immediate community and the 
community of Evanston at large. 
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Historically, Lavrakus has had an intellectual affiliation with 
Rosenbaum. They have worked on joint research projects previously 
at a private research firm and both were members of the ad hoc com-
mittee which wrote the RFP for the Police Management Study of EPD. 
Rosenbaum was also instrumental in Lavrakus being awarded the community 
subcontract in the RCPC. Both Rosenbaum and Lavrakus have an academic 
interest in the "feasibility test" of the community crime prevention 
newsletter. 
Rosenbaum represents the key figure in the Resource Committee 
responsible for the introduction and pursuit of the newsletter as a 
major committee goal. The general role of the Resource Committee 
in the cooptation of the RCPC in this area has been discussed earlier. 
A background sketch of Rosenbaum will therefore be necessary 
to illustrate his role in this cooptive process. This will be 
accomplished in terms of his participation in three roles: 1) his 
role within the police organization 2) his role within the city power 
structure and 3) his role in the RCPC. All three levels are basic 
for an understanding of both the motivation and impact Rosenbaum 
has had on the RCPC. 
Rosenbaum was hired in June of 1980 as the Director of Planning 
and Research at EPD, a position previously held by a lieutenant. His 
hiring was the initial stage of the civilianization process outlined 
by both the chief and the city manager as efforts to increase the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the EPD. The conversion of this 
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position was opposed by many top ranking sworn personnel. Therefore 
a degree of resentment existed prior to Rosenbaum's employment. How-
ever, as Rosenbaum began to unfold his own academic and personal ob-
jectives in his new position, this initial resentment developed into 
full-blown hostility. A presentation of the basis of this resent-
ment is necessary in order to understand Rosenbaum's precarious posi-
tion in the hierarchy and the ensuing importance of his role in the RCPC. 
Rosenbaum entered the organization at the management level. His 
employment was resented for a number of reasons. First, the position 
was advertised at a much lower salary than he was hired at. Several 
lieutenants were rumored to have been interested in retiring as sworn 
personnel to take the position as a civilian had the salary been adver-
tised at a higher rate. It was felt by several ranking officers that 
Rosenbaum had pull with the city manager--that he represented an "in" 
at city hall. He was resented particularly because of his salary and 
position reflected a level in the organization which police officers 
worked for years to move themselves up through the rank into manage-
ment positions. 
He was also resented because he was a civilian and civilians 
lacked the experience of being a "cop". This issue was a particularly 
salient issue because he was hired as the planner for the entire police 
department. It was reasoned that such a role had to be filled by some-
one with police experience, by someone who understood what it was like 
to be a "cop on the street". Education was also an issue which was not 
greatly respected within this particular organization. 
115 
The Record Section was officially under the direct supervision 
of Captain Bennett. Since one of Rosenbaum's major goals and re-
sponsibilities was the automation of the record keeping system, it was 
necessary to work directly with Bennett unless a "go between" could be 
found as a substitute. It might be hypothesized that Rosenbaum's 
support and backing of this author as the Supervisor of Records 
(the second management position to be converted to a civilian posi-
tion) was part of his plan to influence this section without a direct 
relationship or confrontation with Bennett himself. 
Bennett was one of the individuals whom Rosenbaum frequently 
commented about being "threatened" and angry about him being hired 
and the influence that he had begun to have on the chief. Rosenbaum 
also maintained that it was the plan at city hall to gradually squeeze 
Bennett out of responsibilities and make him angry enough to retire. 
Bennett was only one of many "enemies" which Rosenbaum had within the 
organization. All of these conflictive situations are i~portant for 
understanding the background of Rosenbaum's role in the police depart-
ment. 
With the coming of Chief Rogers in January, Rosenbaum was 
6 
stripped of his position as the division head of the Record Section. 
Rogers informed Rosenbaum that he was doing this to "put him in his 
place:' and give him a chance to prove himself. This has had a ma;or 
6 
Rosenbaum had been promoted in May 1981 by the retiring chief against 
the protests of other staff who felt they better deserved the pro-
motion because of their years of experience on the iob. 
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impact on Rosenbaum;s role within the police department. He has alwavs 
been the obiect of much criticism and ooen hostilitv, howeverf he alwavs 
had the backine of the former chief and the influence on the chief's 
decision making. Rosenbaum repeatedly stated that he did not need to 
"fraternize" with either the rank and file or ranking officers to 
establish a power base within the organization because "knowledge was 
power". His power and influence depended exclusively on his relation-
ship with the chief and to a certain extent, his influence on the city 
manager who had played a prominent role in hiring him. As previously 
mentioned, both these individuals have left employment in Evanston. 
Rosenbaum is faced with a situation where he formed his "power base'; 
exclusively on personal relationships with individuals. Once these 
individuals are replaced, his patterns of influence no longer exist. 
This situation has had a observable effect on his behavior in 
the RCPC meetings. He frequently misses meetings or comes in late. 
He also speaks less frequently than he did in earlier sessions. This 
power situation may have profound effects on his future involvement 
in the RCPC. Chief Rogers, when attending one meeting of the RCPC, 
actually verbally reprimanded Rosenbaum for one of his statements in 
front of the entire committee. Rosenbaum confided in the author that 
he was looking for employment elsewhere. The next few months many re-
veal some interesting changes in terms of the power structure and 
direction the activities of the RCPC take. 
The feasibility test as written into the CCCPP. represented an 
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area where Rosenbaum could exert influence on departmental and 
community policy. However, more importantly, the feasibility test re-
presented an opportunity to achieve an academic goal in an applied 
setting which would prove to be the first of its kind. An astounding 
variety of crime prevention strategies have been implemented across 
the country. These strategies have been developed by citizens, sworn 
personnel, academians, and a combination of all three. However, none 
of these strategies has evern been scientifically controlled and measur-
ed as to effectiveness. Rosenbaum envisioned the feasibility test in 
Evanston as a major academic breakthrough for the field and as a 
significant boost for his own academic career and credentials. It was 
through Rosenbaum's personal interest in this feasibility test that the 
crime prevention newsletter was introduced to the committee. The rea-
son for the selection of the newsletter as the "experiemental condition" 
to be administered has already been traced to the time and measurement 
constraints of the crime prevention grant. It can therefore be asserted 
that the process of producing the newsletter was also the result of 
still another level of cooptation. 
Summary 
It has been the main hypothesis of this study that the Residential 
Crime Prevention Committee has been the object of cooptive processes 
from various persons and levels of authority within the power struc-
ture of city administration. First, the RCPC was analy3ed as the ob-
ject of the intermittent process of cooptation by the city manager and 
the police chief. It was found that the RCPC took on varying de-
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grees of importance as political circumstances changed. What had been 
initiated as one small part of a grant in developing a comprehensive 
crime prevention program for Evanston, took on new political significance 
when the police chief, the police department, and the city manager 
came under criticism for the escalating crime problem. City and police 
officials pointed to the formation of the RCPC as a city effort to 
alleviate the crime problem and develop a working relationships be-
tween the police and the community. 
Community fervor subsided, partially because of the city's con-
tracting of the Police Management Study and later because of the chief's 
announcement of his forthcoming retirement. As a result, the RCPC be-
came less significant in the eyes of the police department. Subsequent-
ly, the city manager left the city to manage another city and thus his 
interest in the RCPC subsided. 
Renewed interest in the RCPC has developed through the appoint-
ment of a new police chief. This interest has been analyzed as a factor 
congruent with the chief's previous involvement in community/police 
relations in another city. It has also been attributed to the new 
chief's lack of a social base in the police organization itself and 
his subsequent need to develop a social base within the community. 
Cooptation has also been analyzed as a process employed by the 
Resource Committee on behalf of the police department. Time and 
measurement contraints imposed by the grant made the need for a rapid 
deliverable product to ILEC a major concern. By educating and struc-
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turing the RCPC in a specific way, the Resource Committee has been 
successful in developing and implementing an experimental design which 
will given them the needed data. This process occurred inspite of pro-
tests by RCPC members. It was demonstrated that this occurred because 
RCPC members were still accomplishing some of the personal goals which 
had motivated their original involvement. 
The results of this study indicate that cooptive processes may 
operate in many aspects of social life and at many levels. The fact 
that cooptive processes are often employed in combination with other 
aspects of power, influence, and goal attainment is an interesting 
phenomena worth investigating. 
The education, guidance and influences of the Resource Committee 
on the developing RCPC have been analyzed in terms of the operation of 
cooptation. However, it must also be pointed out that these forces 
brought organization and direction to these meetings. It is very like-
ly that without this guidance, the Residential Crime Prevention Com-
mittee would not be in existence today. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
Actual Versus Potential Social Protest 
The preliminary chapters of this thesis have dealt with the his-
torical background which precipitated the formation of the Residential 
Crime Prevention Committee. These chapters attempted to outline the 
general sequence of events surrounding the police controversy and 
responses made by both city and police administrators. A careful 
analysis of newspaper articles covering this controversy indicated 
that only one community organization was actually involved in voicing 
opposition to the police chief specifically and the police department 
in general. As previously discussed, the local newspaper played a 
prominent role in "legitimizing" the concerns and demands of this 
community group. On the basis of this historical analysis, the actual 
threat which this community group represented to the police department 
and the city administration appears to have been negligible. Indica-
tions are that the fervor created by the Evanston Review in this 
situation would have had relatively little impact, had city officials 
chosen not to respond to the charges. Responses by city officials 
merely served as additional sources of information for future news-
paper articles. Reactions by the city government provided further 
legitimation for Marywood Neighbors Association as "the" voice of the 
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community and provided the Evanston Review with material to carry on 
a "community dialogue" and the production of "sensational copy". 
Evanston as a Cooptive Case 
In Selznick's study of the TVA (1949), the 'coopted' group of 
voluntary organizations possessed a basic level of knowledge concern-
ing agriculture and the education of local farmers. This knowledge 
was one of the various reasons why the TVA felt the support of these 
voluntary organizations was important. In a study of cooptation in the 
communist bloc countries of Eastern Europe, Bielasiak (1980) effective-
ly demonstrated the community party's cooptation of much needed 
"expert knowledge". 
The unique characteristic of the RCPC in Evanston was the fact 
that this group had no knowledge base on which to structure their 
participation in crime prevention. This relative ignorance of crime 
prevention strategies made the education of this committee a major 
task of the Resource Committee. In today's complex urban milieu a 
protest group, whether it be a community group or a large scale 
social movement, cannot effectively formulate policy or have an im-
pact on administrative decision making without a certain expertise 
in the issues involved. This has become increasingly apparent in 
such areas as environmental control and nuclear power, where citizen 
groups have had to achieve a specific level of understanding of comp-
licated technical issues in order to lobby effectively with large 
corporate businesses or the government. In the area of crim preven-
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tion, citizens who are relatively unfamiliar with the shift of modern 
policing and preventative strategies, often view increased manpower 
as the solution to reducing the crime rate. 
In recent years, approaches to policing have begun to focus on 
the interaction of the police and the community in both the prevention 
of crime and the apprehension of criminal offenders. Studies such as 
Dentinger (1979), Vardalis (1979), Kelly (1981), and Auten (1981) dis-
cuss four issues which have lead to the emphasis on the interaction 
of police and the community in preventing crime. The first issue 
points to the fact that traditional preventive patrol does not prevent 
crime. Preventive patrol is based on the theory of omnipresence which 
assumes that random movements of highly visable patrol officers can 
eliminate or substantially reduce the opportunity for the criminal act 
to occur. Studies such as the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experi-
ment (President's Commision on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 
1967) or Wilson (1975) indicate that substantial increases in random 
preventive patrol by police have no effect on the actual crime rate. 
A second issue involved is the fact that the crime rate is con-
tinually rising--an indication that police alone cannot control 
crime. Thirdly, the fiscal state of many cities has necessitated an 
actual decrease in police manpower allocation, which further reinforces 
the contention that citizens must become involved in crime prevention. 
A fourth issue raised with regard to traditional policing philosophy 
pertains to whether crime prevention can even by considered a legit-
imate goal of a police department. Thus in reality, it may not be 
an attainable goal by police alone because they cannot attack the 
causes of crime. 
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The traditional mode of policing has been in the form of react-
ing to reported crimes with efforts directed specifically on appre-
hension rather than prevention. However, if one were to measure 
police productivity in terms of apprehension or clearance rates, 
these low rates (only 12% nation wide) indicate that police are 
realtively ineffective in clearing criminal cases also. The above 
considerations lead to the contention that there is a distinct need 
for a re-definition of the role of police in the community. Such 
a shift in policing philosophy necessitates the re-education of the 
community at large. This is another aspect of the educational process 
involved in the RCPC. 
It is therefore the contention of this study that neither the 
RCPC itself or the Marywood social movement organization which 
precipitated the RCPC, posed actual threats to the power structure 
in Evanston. However, as the RCPC is now considerably more in tune 
with crime prevention strategies and the Resource Committee has ac-
complished its major objective, the RCPC is thus expected to exert 
considerably more influence on future policy. 
The increased level of expertise among RCPC members at the 
present point may be a precipitating factor to this committee be-
coming independent of the Resource Committee and the city/police 
administration as a whole. The RCPC could conceivably institute 
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its own crime prevention programs independently or the committee itself 
could disband and take their newly acquired knowledge back to their 
own communities or neighborhoods and institute a program at that level. 
The possibility of the RCPC becoming an independent body would 
seem unlikely from the simple level of resources. RCPC members have 
thus far not invested any money from their organizations into RCPC 
activities. All expenses have been paid by the police department with 
funds from the crime prevention grant. UP to this point there has been 
no need for RCPC participating organizations to contribute monetarily 
nor has the police department asked for any contributions. However, 
official funding for this committee will expire in June 1982. It has 
already been indicated by a member of the Resource Committee that the 
police chief expects the RCPC organizations to put up funding for the 
continuation of the program. The events of the next few months will be 
crucial to the future of this committee. It is speculated that RCPC 
members and the organizations which they represent, are going to have 
to benefit more directly from the activities of the RCPC before they 
might be willing to invest money into the maintenance of the committee. 
In light of the fact that the newsletter was not an overwhelming prior-
ity of all RCPC members, the development of specific programs more 
pertinent to members interests and needs during the next three months, 
appears to be a crucial factor in the future of the RCPC. 
A second factor which lessens the possibility of the RCPC 
choosing to function as an independent entity is the fact that the 
approval and legitimation of the police chief and the city admini-
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stration has been a central issue since the formation of the committee. 
The official backing of the police department gives members a certain 
amount of prestige in both their eyes and the eyes of the communities 
which they represent. Crime prevention programs and strategies are 
unlikely to continue without recognition and support from the police 
department. 
The interaction of the police department and the community is a 
crucial factor underlying modern policing philosophy. It seems un-
likely that either the RCPC or the police department will opt for 
this separation once funding is eliminated. It seems appropriate to 
question just what the police department will do if RCPC members refuse 
or are unable to finance the future of the RCPC. The police department 
has invested considerable amounts of time and money into the formation 
of this committee. It has been publicized in the Evanston Review so 
community members are aware of its existence. Also, as previously 
discussed, the new police chief has a vested interest in developing a 
strong rapport with the community. In light of these issues it 
appears unlikely that EPD will let the RCPC simply fall by the way 
side. 
As has been stated previously, none of the RCPC members were in-
volved in the original police controversy itself. Once RCPC member 
does represent Marywood Neighbors Association, however, he was not 
personally involved in the controversy. Interviews with RCPC members 
indicated that the coverage which this controversy received in the 
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Evanston Review had little if any influence on their interest in the 
RCPC. This further supports the contention that the RCPC did not re-
present a threat to either the polic~ or city administration. The per-
sonal and organizational motives of RCPC members was discussed earlier. 
Challenging the city or police administration was not an objective 
stated by any committee members. All stated goals pertained to the 
advancement of their own participation in the community as well as the 
mobilization of residents within their community. 
The thesis of this paper has been concerned with the use of 
cooptive strategies by a local government/police department as a 
means of neutralizing community protest. The conception, evolution, 
and organization of the Residential Crime Prevention Committee has been 
examined in detail to determine whether this committee was the result 
of a cooptive strategy. In the previous chapter it has been demonstrat-
ed that the importance attributed by city and police administrators 
to the RCPC has varied over time and circumstances. 
This study has not found sufficient data to support the hypothe-
sis that the RCPC was first proposed as a means of alleviating community 
dissension. However, it cannot be dismissed that the RCPC was cited 
on several occasions by city/police administrators to be evidence 
that the city was attempting solutions to the "problems" raised by 
community leaders. While evidence for the cooptation of the RCPC by 
the police/city administration has not been found, the initial concept-
ion of the RCPC in the crime prevention grant and the particular 
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timing of that conception, might be interpreted as a precipatory 
move on the part of the police department. In light of the Evanston-
ian tradition of a highly participative citizenry, and the police de-
partment's awareness of a particularly high burglary and theft rates 
in 1979 (the vear the grant orooosal was written). it might be con-
cluded that the RCPC was an "anticipatorv" move designed to prevent 
crime from becoming a community issue. Crime has been an issue of 
varvine intensitv at both the community and national level since the 
60's. It is a particularly volatile issue because it has had a direct 
impact on manv people's lives--whether in beine an actual victim of an 
criminal act or simply experiencine the fear of crime. Because of its 
volatile nature, crime could easilv become a maior communitv issue 
through a "snowballing" effect. 
If the "anticipation" of such a potential controversy was behind 
the conceptualization of the RCPC in 1979, it would appear to be an 
astute analysis on the oart of oolice and/or citv officials. As it 
is. the RCPC served as a concillatorv resoonse when the Marvwood 
erouo did in fact attemot to make crime a citv wide issue among citi-
zens in 1980. 
Whatever the motivation behind the inclusion of the RCPC in the 
grant, it served to placate citizens in two ways. In the initial stag-
es of the 1980 oolice controversv it served as an adiunct to the various 
other resoonses bv oolice and citv officials. This asoect has been 
discussed oreviouslv. Following the formation of the RCPC. Daniel 
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Whitmore (one of the two major actors in the original Marvwood grouo) 
attended a meeting as an alternate for Jim Freund. Durine this meet-
ine Whitemore attemoted to activate RCPC members to act as a qrouo and 
oress the citv manaqer to make orqanizational and oolicy changes at 
EPD prior to the selection of a new police chief. The RCPC was not very 
receptive to Whitemore's ideas. One committee member actually voiced 
the opinion that Whitmore had political motivations behind his issues 
which the RCPC did not want to be involved in. 
Following this meeting, Whitmore wrote an article for the 
Evanston Review, in which he called for Evanston citizens to actively 
pursue this line of action. He summed up his discussion with the 
statement that the "CCCPP is every bit the sociologist's paradise that 
its five-barreled name suggest." and the "only noticeable instrument 
against residential burglary which has been created by the CCCPP in two 
years is an advisory council of neighborhood groups that is thinking 
about putting out a newsletter sometime soon" (Evanston Review, Novem-
her 5, 1981: 21). 
Members of the RCPC were extremely angry at Whitmore's implica-
tion that the RCPC was doing nothing about the crime problem. Richard 
Clark wrote a rebuttal to Whitmore's letter where he stated "Mr 
Whitmore, while you are running about clamoring for vour concerns and 
denigrating anvone who isn't right behind vou. I. and manv other con-
cerned citizens and oolice. are oatientlv doing something oositive and 
oroactive about rising crime" (Evanston Review, December 10. 1981: 17) 
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The reader will recall that Whitmore had been a major actor 
in the original police controversv. In liqht of the RCPC's reaction 
and interoretation of Whitnore's attempts to mobilize citizens to 
demand certain concessions from the citv administration. it aopears 
that the city was successful in "draining off" any inclinations for 
public community protest. 
In analyzing a second source of cooptation emanating from the 
Resource Committee, it has been demonstrated that the Resource 
Committee did have a vested interest in the RCPC's choice of crime 
Prevention policv and strategies. The Resource Committee was in need 
of a "auick" evaluative study of a crime prevention strateqv imole-
mented in Evanston. It was pointed out that the community newletter 
provided such a study. At this point it seems pertinent to discuss 
whether this "influence" exerted by the Resource Committee and the sub-
sequent adoption of the newsletter proposal bv the RCPC, can in fact 
be considered "cooptation" as opposed to "collaboration". 
Cooptation Versus Collaboration 
Inherent characteristics and specific circumstances would in-
dicate that the RCPC as an organization, would be an easy target 
for cooptive strategies. The first characteristic which RCPC members 
shared was their relative ignorance in the area of crime prevention. 
As previously discussed, the first two months of RCPC meetings were 
devoted to an educational process by the Resource Committee. Three 
subcommittee members were charged with the primary responsibility 
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of reviewing the massive amount of crime prevention literature which 
the police department had accumulated and in providina a summary of 
these strategies to the whole committee. A committee composed large-
ly of members who have no "expert knowledge" on the subject for which 
thev are to develoo orogram oolicv. reoresents a group which can 
easily fall prey to the influences of the Resource Committee. 
Ravine relativelv little orevious experience in crime preven-
tion, the RCPC was not in a position to formulate its own policy. 
Therefore RCPC members actually represented no threat to the Resource 
Committee in this area. It might be concluded that the Resource 
Committee did not actually "coopt" the RCPC but rather served as a 
steering committee or as a resource panel of experts which resulted 
in the domination of the RCPC in choosing the first item of priority. 
This domination or influence is grounded in the initial lack of know-
ledge of RCPC members. 
In general, the RCPC was willing to allow the Resource Committee 
to structure meetings and to take the initial in setting organizational 
objectives. The original intent behind the Resource Committee is 
just what its name would imply--a resource for the RCPC to draw upon 
in the formation of preventive strategies. It seems appropriate at 
this time to make a conceptual distinction between cooptation as an 
intended strategy and cooptation as a strategy consequence. 
Selznick (1949) makes this distinction in his study of the TVA. 
TVA officials fully intended to coopt local voluntary associations 
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by absorbing them into the TVA network. This was done in anticioation 
of overlaooine and nossiblv antithetical eoals and as a means of 
securine a social base which would iustifv its indenendence from the 
federal eovernment. The consequence of this cooptive process was a 
marked decrease in the TVA's control over policy and what Selznick 
terms a "compromise" of democratic principles 
In the case of Evanston, the conceptualization and formation of 
the RCPC has already been analyzed as an "anticipatory" strategy. 
Since the conceptualization had no specific body of leaders selected 
for inclusion, it would appear that a case cannot be made for analyz-
ing the proposed RCPC as an intentional cooptive strategy. 
It is further argued that neither can the RCPC be considered 
cooptive in it consequences. Lack of expertise or knowledge has al-
ready been cited as a major factor which precludes the existence of 
cooptation. Three additional factors will be discussed below. 
A second RCPC characteristic which would call the use of coop-
tation into question is the fact that none of the RCPC members knew 
each other prior to the formation of this committee. Nor were any 
of the RCPC members familiar with members of the Resource Committee 
(with the exception of one member). Unfamiliarity among committee 
members makes the initial formation of committee policy difficult. 
The needs and concerns of each community group were not know by the 
group as a whole, nor were nay needs which they might share in common. 
As a result committee members were essentiallv straneers lackine a 
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common base by which to make decisions. Again, this would seem to 
dismiss cooptation as a consequence. The lack of a personal or 
organizational network between RCPC members would appear to negate 
the necessity of cooptation. If organizational members had no prior 
knowlege of crime prevention strategies and no history of working to-
gether, it would seem natural that the Resource Committee would ereat-
lv influence the direction of the RCPC. The Resource Committee had 
one major resource--expertise. The RCPC possessed the other major 
resource needed for policy formation--access to community residents. 
The Resource Committee represented common ground to all committee 
members. Again, it might be concluded that the Resource Committee pro-
vided guidance and structure to an organization which would have other-
wise floundered for focus in its initial stages. 
Thirdly, RCPC community leaders did not come to the committee 
with well-formulated goals or obiectives. RCPC members were not aware 
of the various crime prevention strategies available nor did they 
have·any well formulated ideas on the need for prevention strategies 
in their particular geographical areas. A committee which does not 
have well formulated goals is in need of a general sense of purpose 
and direction. This was clearly stated by a number of members at the 
very first meeting. The Resource Committee was available to provide 
such direction and organization. 
A fourth characteristic particular to the RCPC was a community 
view which the maiority of members shared. They were generally of 
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the opinion that the RCPC would have little purpose or impact without 
the express support of the city/police administrators. Thus in their 
view, it was of utmost importance that the city government legitimize 
the existence of their committee and any programs which they might put 
forth. The RCPC sought this legimimation through the Resource Commit-
tee. Such a relationship would more closely approach collaboration 
where a certain level of reciprocity exists between the Resource Com-
mittee and the RCPC. This would be in opposition to cooptation which 
implies that a dominant organization takes the initiative to incorp-
orate a group which it considers to be in opposition to them. 
The above discussion has centered on characteristics of the 
RCPC which placed them in an initially dependent role. This depenq-
ency then is basically due to a lack of knowledge, lack of a communi-
cation network. lack of clear cut goals and a oerceived lack of 
legitimation bv the larger communitv and the citv administration. 
In addition, there were the personal and organizational motives of 
RCPC members which were discussed earlier. As pointed out, these 
committee members had varying reasons for being involved in the RCPC. 
A large proportion of these individual goals have been met already 
with the introduction of crime prevention as a community issue. in-
spite of the fact that many RCPC members were not in favor of the 
community newsletter as the first priority. In sum then, it has been 
determined that the Resource Committee (as representatives of the 
police/city administration) possess three main resources needed by the 
RCPC. These are funding, legitimacy and knowledge. 
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It can thus be concluded that the RCPC represented an organiza-
tion where the interests of a varietv of neonle (including the Resource 
Committee) came together in the same arena. This wide spectrum of in-
dividual and group motives is prevalent in most oreanizations. The 
Resource Committee's initially strong influence might therefore be 
attributed to the fact that these four members were in possession of 
the major resources needed by the RCPC--namely, the knowledge, the 
finances• and an interoreanizational network of communication and 
support. 
In light of the above discussion, it might be concluded that the 
social processes which governed the formation of the RCPC and which 
guided the establishment of formal obiectives. were not cooptive in 
nature. Rather. thev represent the negotiation of organizational and 
policy issues by a committee which possesses a wide variety of social 
and personal interests. Negotiation is a process inherent in any 
organization and in any cooperative effort. The variety of interests 
held by RCPC members contributes to the "richness" of the committee 
as a whole. Such a variety of goals and interests is not to be 
interpreted as a pluralist analysis of the RCPC. Even though the 
personal and organizational interests of individual members is so 
varied, RCPC members share the common goal of improving or maintaining 
the quality of life in their neighborhoods. While each member's indivici-
ual needs or interest may not be entirely satisfied at a particular 
moment in the life of the committee, each member has thus far approach-
ed the fulfillment of some goals at least partially. 
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It has been asserted that the Resource Committee had specific 
organizational objectives from the start. They possessed the most 
crucial resources which the RCPC needed to develop and stav alive. 
These soecific ~oals do not preclude the general goal which the Re-
source Committee holds with the RCPC as a whole. This is the basic 
interest in building a solid working relationship between the citizenry 
and the police department. While the wavs i~ which this goal is to be 
carried out in practice mav varv. the negotiation Process which results 
from such a varietv of ideas is central to the work of anv committee 
charged with a common goal. 
The influence exerted by the Resource Committee in the initial 
stages of committee formation is typical of a situation where one 
faction within an organization possesses more resources and more 
alternatives. It is therefore hypothesized that the RCPC will be less 
susceptible to the influence of the Resource Committee, as RCPC members 
become more "educated" with regard to crime prevention strategies 
and they are able to more clearly articulate their own goals and 
objectives. 
This study set out to determine whether cooptation was utilized 
as a social process in the evolution. formation. and development of 
the Residential Crime Prevention Committee. The results of this 
study indicate that the process of collaboration more closely approxi-
mates the Evanston situation. In analvzing this case study, ~ertain 
theoretical and methodological problems have surfaced. 
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In reviewing the various ways cooptation has been studied and 
identified earlier in this paper, it appears that the concept of coopt-
ation has taken on a more general meaning than the meaning which 
Selznick first imparted on it. Its use has become so general, that 
it becomes difficult at times to distinguish it from collaboration or 
cooperation. For example, in the case of Bielasiak's study (1981) 
why should an organization specifically seeking a certain level of 
expertise which it needs, be classified as cooptation (be it the 
communist party or otherwise)? How does this process differ from a 
business which hires people who possess certain skills or characteris-
tics which they are in need of? Bielasiak may have very specific 
and valid reasons for why believes cooptation has been empoyed in 
his•study, but never conceptually or methodologically distinguishes 
cooptation from other processes which might be operating. 
Burt (1980a; 1980b) has attempted to measure cooptation mathema-
tically. However, he assumes that merger patterns and structural auton-
omy are empirical indicators for cooptation. They might very well be 
but they are indicators for many other processes as well. Burt has 
taken a general term (cooptation) and attempted to measure it in a 
very specific business setting. This makes the goal of generalizing 
such findings difficult in other settings. 
No one study has been able to offer an operationalization of 
cooptation which adequately encompasses the entire meaning of the 
term nor has the same meaning been transferrable from situation to 
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situation. Since two of the basic goals of sociology involve the 
identification of social processes such as cooptation and the generali-
zability of these concepts across groups, it would appear that the 
conceptualization and operationalization of cooptation in a distinguish-
able manner from other processes is greatly needed. 
The resent discussion represents a case study which examines the 
possibility of cooptation in a community organization. The case study 
approach is a slow and sometimes not easily generalizable body of data. 
At the most basic level, cooptation is a method of power acquisition 
and allocation. At the present time the case study of specific power 
relations appears to be the most comprehensive method of studying this 
process. However, future efforts in the area should attempt to 
develop more general, comprehensive empirical indicators of cooptation 
so that the measurement of this concept can proceed from an indepth 
case study to a more generalizable theoretical framework. 
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APPENDIX A 
1. What community organization do you represent? 
2. What geographical area does this organization cover? 
3. How many total members would you estimate your organizationa has? 
4. How many active members does your organization have during any 
given period of time? 
5. Do you belong to other community based organizations? (i.e., 
church, block, business, professional). 
6. Has your organization worked with any other organizations repre-
sented on the Residential Crime Prevention Committee previously? 
Which groups and on what type of projects? 
7. Has your organization previously or is your organization present-
ly working with the Evanston Police Department? 
8. What other community issues has your organization been involved in? 
(presently and in the past). 
9. If your group has a community problem or concern which requires 
the attention of the Evanston City Administration, what public 
office or official (s) does your organization contact or approach? 
10. If this official/office is unresponsive or unable to solve your 
specific community problem, what alternative action (s) does your 
organization take? 
11. Have you sought help from persons or departments in the city in 
the past which you have felt to be uncooperative or unresponsive 
to community needs? Please specify. 
12. Are there persons or departments within the city administration 
which you feel are very responsive to citizen needs? 
13. In general, how responsive do you think the Evanston city admin-
istration is to community needs or concerns? Give examples if 
posaible. 
14. In general, how responsive do you think the Evanston Police De-
partment to citizen needs? 
15. \~at skills or qualities do you think are important in the hiring 
of a new city manager? 
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16. What changes should be made in the way the city manager's office 
deals with the public and the city council with the hiring of the 
new city manager? Please compare these proposed changes with the 
way the former city manager interacted witn the public and city 
council. 
17. Are you an officer in your organization? 
18. How would you divide the proportions of male and female members 
in your organization? (i.e. males 40%; females 60%) or give 
numerical estimates if possible. 
19. How would you divide your organizational members in terms of in-
come? What percentage would you estimate to fall in each of these 
income categories? 
Under $10,000 
$10,000-%15,000 
$15,100-$20,000 
$20,100-$30,000 
$30,100-$40,000 
$40,100-$50,000 
Over $50,000 
20. What proportion of your members has: 
Less than 12 years of schooling 
High School Diploma 
Some College 
College Degree 
Some Graduate Credit 
Graduate Degree 
21. How would you classify the age group of the majority of the members 
belonging to your organization? Please check one. 
Under 20 
21-35 
36-50 
51-60 
61-70 
Over 71 
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A. Crime Prevention 
1. What do you hope to accomplish by your organizations' involve-
ment in the development of this program? 
2. How did your organization become interested in this program? 
3. What kinds of crime prevention activities is your organiza-
tion currently involved in? 
4. What is your opinion of the crime situation in Evanston? 
5. What is your opinion of the crime situation in your area? 
6. How much of a problem do you thing crime is in Evanston? 
B. Police/Community Relations 
1. Does your organization feel that the prevention of crime is: 
a. more the responsibility of citizens and community groups 
b. more the responsibility of the police department 
c. a shared responsibility of both the police department and 
the citizenry. 
2. What do you expect the police department's role to be in the 
development of this program? 
3. What do you expect the city administration's role to be in the 
development of this program? 
4. How closely has your community organization worked with the 
police department in the past? Have you: 
a. invited them to talk to your organization 
b. attended presentations held by police department 
c. reported area problems or reported suspicious events. 
5. How would you rate the overall quality of service provided by 
the police department? 
6. What things would you change in the way police approach crime 
prevention and the solving of crime? 
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7. How does your organization feel about working with the police 
department to develop a crime prevention program? 
8. Do they_ see this as a beneficial possibility? 
9. Does your organization feel that most crime is committPn hv 
persons outside your area or by people residing inside your 
community area? 
10. Are there any particular areas in your community which your 
organization considers unsafe? 
C. Community Organization in General 
1. What other types of programs is your organization involved in? 
2. How old is the organization? 
3. Why did the organization form? 
4. How many members comprise your organization? 
5. How many are active members? 
6. How often do you meet? 
7. How many "officers" represent your organization? 
8. Do you have an executive board? 
9. How many are on it? 
D. Residential Crime Prevention Committee 
1. How helpful has the Resource Committee been to the committee 
as a whole? 
2. What individua'l members of the Resource Committee contributed 
to the goals and programs of this committee? 
3. Which committee members do you find to be most informative 
or productive in terms of ideas or practical suggestions? 
4. Research on other communitv organizations has found that in 
order for citizens to remain involved in a committee such as 
Residential Crime Prevention Committee, the participants 
must be "getting" something out of it. What are you getting 
out of your involvement in this committee? 
5. Has your organization worked previously with any of the 
other organizations involved in this committee? With any of 
the Resource Committee? 
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